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INTRODUCTION
The unthinkable happens-you are arrested. You are taken to
the police station, put in an interrogation room, and read your
rights. We all know them from television by now:
You have the right to remain silent. If you choose to give up this
right, anything you say can and will be used against you in a court
of law. You have the right to consult with an attorney, and to have
the attorney present during interrogation. If you cannot afford an
attorney, one will be appointed to represent you. Do you under-
stand these rights?'
Of course you do; you are a law professor, an attorney, a well-
informed citizen.
"I demand to see my lawyer and refuse to answer any questions."
"Too bad, buddy, we're short on patience today. You're gonna
talk to us without your lawyer."
"What? I demand to see my lawyer!"
"You have to comply."
"I'll sue."
(general laughter by officers present)
After hours of nonstop interrogation, one of five possible outcomes
emerges: you are guilty and "spill your guts"; you are innocent but
confess or make damaging admissions; you are guilty but have the
exceptional fortitude to remain quiet; you are innocent and manage
to remain silent; you are innocent and eventually convince the
police to release you or at least end the interrogation. Except for
the first two situations, in which you may have the limited remedy
of having your statement excluded from the prosecutor's case-in-
chief,2 there are no remedies available to you for the violation of
t A.B. 1983, Wellesley College;J.D. 1989, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California at Berkeley. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin.
' The Supreme Court established the general substantive requirements for police
officers in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 The introduction of a statement taken in violation of Miranda and/or the Self-
Incrimination Clause will be allowed if it is later determined to have been harmless
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your so-called "rights."
This Article will examine the Supreme Court's backpedaling on
the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona and how that deci-
sion's attendant exclusionary rule has affected both the manner in
which investigations are conducted by police departments in this
country and the remedies available to citizens who are subject to
unlawful government conduct. I propose that current developments
in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence actually encourage law enforce-
ment officials to violate the standards of conduct imposed upon
them by the Miranda decision, and that current developments in
civil rights jurisprudence make impossible a successful action based
upon a violation of either Miranda or the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination. Thus, a rational police officer in today's
world will (and often does) ignore the dictates of Miranda. This
problem can be solved only if the Supreme Court reconstitutionaliz-
es Miranda, at least to the extent necessary to enforce those
restraints on state and federal officials that it initially found crucial
to properly safeguarding an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Failing this, the Court should cease
promulgating prophylactic rules that it cannot or will not enforce,
both to avoid losing institutional prestige and to curb the shift in
constitutional interpretative authority from itself to the executive
branches of state and federal governments.4
In Part I, I detail the primary obstacles to enforcing Fifth
Amendment values. First, I briefly describe the already well-
documented evolution of the prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination,5 which after reaching the pinnacle of protection in
Escobedo v. Illinois,6 settled into its most balanced and modern
error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1991) ("[T]he Court has
applied harmless error analysis to a wide range of errors and has recognized that
most constitutional errors can be harmless."); infra notes 56-57 and accompanying
text.
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
" This argument holds true regardless of one's agreement with the normative
views underlyingMiranda. Whether one believes thatMiranda was a bad decision that
will lead to the release of additional criminals to prowl our already unsafe streets or
that the Miranda warnings were a necessary obstacle in the path of an overly powerful
State's ability to trample an individual's dignity, it should be possible to reach
agreement concerning whether, on any particular topic, the Court ought to issue
commands that are not going to be followed.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "nor shall any person.., be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself").
6 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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approach in Miranda v. Arizona. The Miranda decision offered the
indispensable advantages of providing a "bright-line" rule for police
officers to follow, aiding courts in adjudication by presuming
confessions to be valid when the prescribed warnings are given, and
fairly evaluating the often competing interests of performing
traditional law enforcement functions and protecting individual
Fifth Amendment rights of those suspected of committing a crime.
I then trace the privilege's subsequent decline in what I term the
Miranda decision's deconstitutionalization, a process that began
almost from its inception and reached its nadir when the Depart-
ment of Justice recommended that Miranda be overruled as an
illegitimate act of judicial policymaking.7 There are now so many
exceptions to Miranda's exclusionary rule that it makes more sense
on a practical level to violate it than to obey it. Additionally, if the
Miranda decision truly has no constitutional mooring, the Court
lacks authority pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion to impose its mandates upon state actors.
Second, I outline the detrimental and perhaps unintended effect
of this deconstitutionalization on actions brought against state and
local officials, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (§ 1983)8
7 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINALJUSTICE,
REPORT No. 1, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL
INTERROGATION (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437, 542-49 (1989)
[hereinafter DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE REPORT] (asserting that Miranda "constituted a
usurpation of legislative and administrative powers, thinly disguised as an exercise in
constitutional exegesis, which rested on fictions and specious arguments"). This
report was written during the tenure of former Attorney General Edwin Meese and
adopted by the subsequent Republican attorneys general. Although there has been
no official declaration on this issue, I doubt that the report reflects the present
position of the Department under Attorney General Janet Reno.
8 Section 1983 states,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Con-
gress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
Similar actions may be brought against federal officials. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)
(holding that plaintiff could sue federal narcotics agents for injuries suffered through
the agents' alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment). The analysis contained both
in the § 1983 case law and in this Article applies with equal force to these so-called
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and based upon allegations of police-coerced confessions. I will
briefly synopsize and analyze most of the case law in this area from
1968 to the present. Those courts that allow a civil rights action
based on an unwarned statement do so on the basis of Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process notions9 or on an expansive
reading of the Fifth Amendment itself. Those courts that dismiss
a civil rights action based on unwarned confessions do so based
upon one or more of the following considerations: (1) Miranda
warnings are merely prophylactic rules, rather than constitutional
prerequisites; (2) the Fifth Amendment cannot be violated unless a
statement is used in a criminal proceeding; (3) the doctrine of
collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of the voluntariness of a
confession; (4) when a peace officer testifies at a criminal trial, he
is not acting under "color of law"; (5) law enforcement officials are
not the proximate cause of the admission of coerced confessions;
and (6) absolute or qualified immunity protects the government
actors involved. I suggest that those courts that dismiss these civil
rights claims are more faithfully following Supreme Court mandates.
I further argue that the confluence of present legal doctrines bars
virtually all § 1983 actions based on alleged violations not only of
Miranda but of the Fifth Amendment itself.
In Part II, I outline the advantages of allowing some remedy for
Miranda violations and discuss the consequences of failing to do so.
Most important, the elimination of Miranda would seriously infringe
upon personal liberties by shifting the responsibility for interpreting
the Constitution from the judiciary to law enforcement officials.
Additionally, permitting some remedy would vindicate federal rights
and foster Miranda's symbolic value as an ideal to be integrated into
the behavioral norms of law enforcement entities and as an
expression of society's commitment to treat each member, even one
charged with a heinous crime, with respect.
Finally, in Part III, I consider various avenues available to
support the Self-Incrimination Clause. Initially, I explore the
possibility of basing a civil rights action upon either the deservedly
maligned doctrine of substantive due process or a broader interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment. I further suggest the more
comprehensive solution of reconstitutionalizing Miranda and its
exclusionary rule, either by true constitutional interpretation of the
Bivens actions.
' See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating"nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
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underlying guarantees of the Fifth Amendment or by recognizing
and refining a concept of "constitutional common law"0 that may
be only conditionally or temporarily required. Each of these
solutions would permit some or all of the following remedies for a
Miranda violation: the exclusionary rule applied solely to the
prosecutor's case-in-chief, the exclusion of all collateral uses of such
evidence, and money damages or injunctive relief. I conclude that
although the legal and policy arguments against traversing these
avenues are sound, they cannot ultimately prevail, lest the Court be
unable to discharge its role as the ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution" in the Fifth Amendment and other vital areas.
I. OBSTACLES TO ENFORCEMENT
There are two primary obstacles to enforcement of the Self-
Incrimination Clause. The first is the Court's deconstitutionaliza-
don of the Miranda warnings. Initially, this change permitted
gradual inroads into Miranda's exclusionary rule. Each inroad
allowed greater use of statements taken in violation of Miranda and
hence made it more attractive to violate the rule. Eventually,
prosecutors and legal scholars began to argue that Miranda was
itself an illegitimate decision and that the Court had no authority
under Article III of the Constitution to promulgate Miranda's
exclusionary rule or, in fact, any prophylactic rules. Such reasoning
has emboldened certain Court members and Justice Department
officials to advocate overruling Miranda entirely or utilizing a largely
ignored federal statute12 to evade its requirements. The second
obstacle to protecting the privilege against self-incrimination
" This phrase was coined by Henry P. Monaghan. See Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1975). According to Monaghan,
a surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional "interpre-
tation" is best understood as something of a quite different order-a sub-
structure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their
inspiration and authority from ... various constitutional provisions; in
short, a constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or
even reversal by Congress.
Id. at 2-3. Much of the analysis contained in part III.C of this Article has its genesis
in Professor Monaghan's groundbreaking work.
" See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 146-47 (1803) (holding that
Article III of the Constitution gives the Court the power to make authoritative
determinations of constitutional law, and thus the Court has the power to declare acts
of Congress unconstitutional).
12 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988).
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concerns the development of Fifth Amendment and civil rights
jurisprudence in such a manner as to exclude any possible damage
action for violation of either the Miranda dictates or the Self-
Incrimination Clause itself.
A. Miranda's Deconstitutionalization
Up until the early 1960s, the admissibility of a defendant's state-
ments in a criminal trial in state court depended upon an assess-
ment of the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether
the confession was the product of an essentially free and uncon-
strained choice by its maker.'" If it was not, the introduction of
such a statement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 The Court looked to such factors as the conduct
of the police in intimidating the suspect and the characteristics of
the suspect that might make him susceptible to coercion, such as his
age, intelligence, education, psychological problems, and physical
limitations.
15
This standard was modified by three events occurring in the
mid-1960s. First, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment
and thus made applicable to the states. 6  Second, the Sixth
Amendment's right to assistance of counsel was extended pre-
indictment to mere police interrogation of a "prime suspect,"
s See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
'4 The admissibility of confessions in federal court was and is regulated by the
Fifth Amendment. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (holding that
"whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary... is controlled by that
portion of the Fifth Amendment... commanding that no person 'shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself'").
"5 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 507 (1963) (concerning a suspect
who was not allowed to call his wife until after he confessed); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315,323 (1959) (concerning a suspectwho was induced to confess through, inter
alia, sympathy falsely aroused); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564-66 (1958)
(concerninga suspect who was promised protection against an angry mob outside the
jailhouse door if he confessed); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-83 (1936)
(concerning suspects who were tortured by officers until they confessed). As
exemplified by the above cases, the constitutional test matured during this time
period from inquiring whether there was compulsion by torture to whether it was the
accused's free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer. See Spano, 360 U.S. at 321
("[A]s law enforcement officers become more responsible, and the methods used to
extract confessions more sophisticated, our duty to enforce federal constitutional
protections does not cease. It only becomes more difficult because of the more
delicate judgments to be made.").
16 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
MIRANDA DECONSTITUTIONALIZED
although for only a brief time.' 7 Finally, the principles embodied
in the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compulsory self-
incrimination were implicated by statements taken from suspects
during custodial interrogations."8 It was the third event that
precipitated the requirement that police officers recite the warnings
quoted in the first paragraph of this Article.
Although now limited to its peculiar facts, 9 at the time
Escobedo v. Illinois was decided, many commentators feared that its
sweeping language regarding the need for counsel before confes-
sions are taken 20 and its attack on the use of confessions in gener-
al 2' presaged the development of a new rule that would bar both
uncounseled confessions and volunteered statements, thus effective-
ly eliminating interrogations. 22 Instead, two years later in Miranda,
the Court specifically permitted volunteered statements, general on-
the-scene questioning before a suspect is taken into custody, and in-
custody interrogation (after the required warnings) based upon an
uncounseled waiver.23 Despite the objectionable police interroga-
tion tactics that continued to be employed under the old "voluntari-
'" See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). The holding in Escobedo
was subsequently limited. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
18 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
"See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (distinguishing Escobedo because
"the Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its own facts"); see also Johnson v.
NewJersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-34 (1966) (noting the "precise holding" of Escobedo and
discounting its "broad implications").
20 "The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period points up its
critical nature as a 'stage when legal aid and advice' are surely needed." Escobedo, 378
U.S. at 488 (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964) (quoting
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring))).
21 "[A] system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the
'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a
system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation." Id. at 488-89 (footnotes omitted).
22 See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN
LAW AND POLICY 161 n.26 (1980) (summarizing predictions of commentators
concerning Escobedo's impact); Arnold N. Enker & Sheldon H. Elsen, Counsel for the
Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47,60-61
(1964) (suggesting that Escobedo "may be creating a novel right not to confess except
knowingly and with the tactical assistance of counsel," rather than the Constitution's
"right... not to be compelled to confess"); RogerJ. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process
in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 669 (1966)
(lamenting that the Escobedo rule "apparently makes available to any suspect a full-
blown right to counsel at the incipient accusatory stage when police interrogation
shifts,... to a probe focusing upon him" without clearly defining when such a shift
occurs).
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
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ness" test,24 and the more modem coercive tactics designed to
"subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner" 25 and put him
"in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational
judgment, "26 the Court found that police-issued Miranda warnings
were sufficient to "dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings."
2 7
Thus, the Miranda decision is best viewed as a compromise
between competing interests.28 The Miranda court attempted to
protect the values enshrined in the Fifth Amendment: 29 individual
24 See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 240-41 (1941) (holding that despite
lawless practices of police interrogators, suspect's self-possession during questioning
refuted charge of involuntariness); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 283 (1936)
(holding that confessions extorted through physical torture were not "free and
voluntary").25 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
26 Id. at 465. The Miranda Court devoted much of its opinion to outlining the
abuses suffered by suspects during "menacing police interrogation procedures." Id.
at 457. The Court described these abuses through the finding of the Commission on
Civil Rights that "'some policemen still resort to physical force to obtain confes-
sions.'" Id. at 446 (citation omitted). The Court also cited to state cases in which
such practices as manhandling a defendant, strapping a completely nude defendant
to a chair, forcing a defendant to submit to a lie detector test when he needed to use
the toilet, and depriving defendants of food and sleep were permitted. See id. at 446
n.7. Finally, the Court reviewed police manuals that advocated deception and the
creation of feelings of fear and hopelessness. See id. at 448-55.27 Id. at 458.
21 See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986) (noting that "the
[Miranda] decision.., embodies a carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect
both the defendant's and society's interests"); Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for
Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67
WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 161 (1989) ("Confronted with the storm of controversy that the
[Escobedo] decision created, the Court retreated in Miranda, and struck a compro-
mise."); Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" bf Criminal Procedure: A Reply to
Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 579 (1990) (arguing that "the Miranda
Court sought to strike a balance between the interests of the police and the rights of
suspects"); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or
Judicial Fiat, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 21-23 (1986) (suggesting that despite the writings
of numerous critics, Miranda was actually a compromise in favor of law enforcement);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 454 (1987)
("[F]ar from handcuffing the police, the warnings work to liberate the police.
Miranda's much-maligned rules permit the officer to continue questioning his isolated
suspect, the very process that the Court[] ... found to be a violation of the [Fifth
[A]mendment."). But see Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV.
1417, 1469-72 (1985) (arguing that in response to racism against southern Blacks and
views of criminals as underdogs and victims, the Miranda Court resolved the
competing interests of law enforcement and individuals by focusing on protection of
the suspect).
' See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458-60 (tracing the roots of the privilege against self-
incrimination from ancient times).
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autonomy,3 0 a preference for an accusatorial system of criminal
prosecution,-" the fairer trial that results from the exclusion of
unreliable testimony,32 and the preservation of proper police
practices, 3 while still permitting most interrogations to go for-
ward.3 4 It accomplished this by issuing a set of "self-applying
regulations,"35 or "bright-line" rules,36 for each police officer to
follow during her custodial interrogation of citizens suspected of
crimes.37 Moreover, it conserved the resources of the courts,
30 See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 330 (1968) ("To
furnish testimonial evidence against himself, with or without oath, was likened to
drawing one's blood, running oneself upon the pikes, or cutting one's throat with
one's tongue."); 8JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2251
at 317 (4th ed. 1961), revised by John T. McNaughton ("The privilege contributes
toward a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the
individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load.").
s" "[T]he American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial,
and the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay.... Governments, state
and federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence
independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an
accused out of his own mouth." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (citation
omitted).
" See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (discussing "our
distrust of self-deprecating statements").
" See id. at 55 ("[S]elf-incriminating statements are likely to be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses.").
' The Court devoted section IV of the Miranda opinion to a discussion of the
needs of law enforcement. It noted that the FBI and police in other countries had
been conducting successful interrogations after delivering warnings for years. See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479-491.
ss HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 132-33 (tentative ed. 1958) (stating that a
"self-applying regulation" is an official mandate that is "susceptible of correct and
dispositive application by a person to whom it is initially addressed").
" The benefits of drawing bright-line rules for peace officers has been recognized
by the Court and commentators. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458
(1981) (noting that "a single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who
have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront") (quoting
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)); Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line
Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 227 (1984) (noting that
"[r]ules tend to limit the importance of subjective judgment, to promote equality, to
control corruption, to simplify administration and to provide a basis for planning
before and after controversies arise"); see also Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment
in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and 'Good Faith, "43 U. PITT. L. REV.
307, 321 (1982) (warning that "it may well be that the rules governing search and
seizure are more in need of greater clarity than greater sophistication").
" The Court believed such limitation upon police conduct to be the only "assur-
ance that practices of this nature [the unlawfully coercive tactics used during custodial
interrogations prior to Miranda] will be eradicated in the foreseeable future."
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allowing the judiciary to monitor more closely these officer/citizen
interactions by providing a model against which all custodial
interrogations could be measured, rather than adjudicating each
interaction on a case-by-case basis.
3 8
While many passages in the decision assume the Miranda
warnings have constitutional stature, the holding itself was a narrow
one: statements obtained in violation of the warnings are inadmissi-
ble as part of the prosecutor's case-in-chief in a criminal trial against
that defendant.3 9 The Court did appear to hold, however, that the
Fifth Amendment applies at the station house" and that the
defendant must be apprised of his rights to prevent a violation of
the Self-Incrimination Clause.4 The Miranda Court left open the
possibility that Congress or the states could implement solutions
aside from the prescribed warnings to ensure that the inherent
compulsions of the custodial interrogation process would not
produce coerced statements. 42 But it was unclear whether this was
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447.
" The drawbacks of the case-by-case approach in the confession context are best
summarized by CharlesJ. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Goodfor the Soul? A Proposal
to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1833-35 (1987). In his article,
Ogletree argued that the due process standard for determining the admission of
confessions, which forced the Court to assess police conduct on a case-by-case basis,
was inadequate because (1) it forced consideration of the innumerable methods of
coercion and inducement employed by police, and the ways that such methods
actually impact on the diverse group of suspects; (2) it did not provide the Court with
the ability to direct the behavior of police; (3) it probably failed to allow the Court
to guide lower courts and to grant relief in many instances involving coercive
interrogations, given the small number of confession cases the Court could review
each year; (4) it did not ensure that suspects knew their rights; and (5) it turned
suppression hearings into a "swearing contest" as parties argued about confessions
that occurred behind closed doors.
" See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ("[T]he prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination.").
4' See id. at 467 ("[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings .... ").
" See id. at 468 ("[S]uch a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the
inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.").
42 See id. at 444 ("[U]nless other fully effective means are devised to inform
accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required."). Congress in fact attempted to do
this by enacting the "Post Miranda Act." See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1989) (stating that
the failure to give warnings is a factor to consider in determining the issue of
voluntariness, but does not automatically exclude an otherwise voluntary confession);
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1968, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2127 (noting that the Act was intended to offset "harmful" effects of certain Court
MIRANDA DECONSTITUTIONALIZED
because that particular method (the allocution of warnings) was not
constitutionally required or because there was not necessarily a
constitutional violation for which the selected method was to
remedy.
43
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts later interpreted the-Miranda
holding as a mere prophylactic measure and made clear that a
violation of Miranda does not equal a constitutional violation. 44 For
example, in Michigan v. Tucker,45 the defendant's statements were
excluded at trial due to an incomplete Miranda warning, yet the trial
judge admitted the testimony of a witness of whom the State
became aware solely through the excluded statements of the
defendant.46 The Court noted that:
Our determination that the interrogation in this case involved no
compulsion sufficient to breach the right against compulsory self-
incrimination does not mean there was not a disregard, albeit an
inadvertent disregard, of the procedural rules later established in
Miranda. The question for decision is how sweeping the judicially
decisions, includingMiranda). This rule ofadmission, which requires no warnings or
other mechanisms to ensure voluntariness, appears to me to fail to offer an
"adequate" alternative safeguard. The Department of Justice has not found it
appropriate to argue that voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda be
admitted pursuant to this statute. But cf. United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129,
1137-38 (10th Cir. 1975) (rejecting defendant's argument that the districtjudge erred
in applying the more lenient standard of § 3501 and finding full compliance with
Miranda and § 3501 constitutional).
"' See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ("[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily
requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the
interrogation process as it is presently conducted.").
"' Numerous law professors have documented this event, some with remorse and
others with pleasure. See e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Introduction-The Changed and
Changing World of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: The Contribution of the Department
ofJustice's Office of Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 395, 400-01 (1989) (noting that
while Miranda was an extremely controversial decision, it is dogmatically accepted in
most circles today, and urging the renewal of a balanced and vigorous debate
concerning criminal procedure); Ogletree, supra note 38, at 1829 (noting that "[n]ot
only do Miranda warnings fail to protect a suspect's right to silence and right to
counsel, but the Supreme Court has substantially restricted Miranda's applicability,
encouraging law enforcement authorities to be truly creative in developing novel
strategies to circumvent the safeguards").
4s 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
46 Defendant told police that during the night of the rape and assault in question
he was with one Robert Henderson. However, this alibi backfired on the defendant
when Henderson testified at trial that the defendant had left Henderson's company
early on the night of the crime and that the defendant had scratches on his face the
next morning. Noticing these scratches, Henderson asked the defendant "if he got
hold of a wild one or something." The defendant answered that it was "some woman
who lived the next block over." Id. at 436-37.
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imposed consequences of this disregard shall be. This Court said
in Miranda that statements taken in violation of the Miranda
principles must not be used to prove the prosecution's case at
trial. That requirement was fully complied with by the state court
here: respondent's statements, claiming he was with Henderson
and then asleep during the time period of the crime were not
admitted against him at trial. This Court has also said, in Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), that the "fruits" of police
conduct which actually infringed a defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights must be suppressed. But we have already concluded that the
police conduct at issue here did not abridge respondent's constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the
prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to
safeguard that privilege. 7
Miranda's standing even as a prophylactic rule has been under-
cut in a series of more recent cases. The deepest incision to date
is the public safety exception,4" which permits a prosecutor to use,
in his case-in-chief, statements taken in direct violation of the
Miranda requirements. In New York v. Quarles,49 police officers
pursued an armed robbery suspect into a supermarket, where he
was frisked and found to be carrying an empty shoulder holster.
After handcuffing the defendant, the pursuing officer asked him the
location of the gun. After the defendant answered, the police
officer retrieved the gun, formally arrested the defendant, and read
" Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added); see also Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523,528
(1987) (discussing Miranda's rule that once an accused expresses his desire for an
attorney the interrogation must cease until the attorney is present). The Barrett court
stated that "this prohibition on further questioning-like other aspects of Miranda-is
not itself required by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on coerced confessions, but
is insteadjustified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose." Id. The court went
on to hold that the Constitution did not require suppression of defendant's
incriminating statement where defendant, after Miranda warnings, stated his willing-
ness to speak to police verbally, but expressed his unwillingness to make a written
statement without the presence of counsel. See id. at 529; see also McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991) (stating that Miranda's warning requirement is
not a dictate of the Fifth Amendment itself but a prophylactic rule); Michigan v.
Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990) (same); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203
(1989) (same).
48 Two states have enacted a similar exception, called the "rescue doctrine," which
states that "exigent circumstances may excuse compliance with the Miranda rules in
instances of overriding need to save human life or to rescue persons whose lives are
in danger." People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 563, 574 (1978) (allowing police to
interview a suspected kidnapper regarding location of victim), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
937 (1979); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (Minn. 1992) (permitting police
to question suspect in order to find burn victim), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1306 (1993).
49 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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him his Miranda rights from a printed card. The defendant then
admitted buying the gun in Florida. The state trial court, as well as
both state appellate courts, held that the original statement as to the
location of the gun was to be excluded because the defendant was
in custody and had not yet been given the warnings required by
Miranda. The further statement regarding the place of purchase
was excluded as evidence tainted by the prior Miranda violation.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that "this case presents a
situation where concern for public safety must be paramount to
adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunci-
ated in Miranda.... [W]e conclude today that there are limited
circumstances where the judicially imposed strictures of Miranda are
inapplicable."
50
Although the Court has not yet found other avenues to admit
statements taken in violation of Miranda in the state's case-
in-chief, it has recently offered numerous other ways that such
statements can be utilized. Statements taken in violation of
Miranda can be used to obtain other leads,5" for impeach-
ment,52 for rebuttal of an insanity defense,5" and at senten-
50 Id. at 653 & n.3. The relevant circumstances were the combination of the
danger presented by the gun, which was concealed somewhere in a public supermar-
ket where a customer, employee, or accomplice might make use of it, with the
possibility that the Miranda warnings would deter Quarles from responding to the
officer's question about the location of the gun. See id. at 657. The Court noted that
there was no claim that the defendant's statements were "actually compelled" by
police conduct, id. at 654 (emphasis added), and reminded defendant that he was
"free on remand to argue that his statement was coerced under traditional due
process standards." Id. at 655 n.5.
" See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,445-46 (1974) (noting that WongSun does
not apply to exclude evidence obtained as a result of an inadvertent disregard of
Miranda where the underlying police conduct infringes a nonconstitutional prophylac-
tic rule only).
52 See e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 716-18 (1975) (holding that statement
taken by a police officer who questioned a defendant after he requested an attorney,
but before the attorney could be contacted, can be used at a criminal trial to impeach
such defendant, should he take the stand); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224
(1971) (holding that statements taken from defendant without informing him of his
right of access to appointed counsel could be used to impeach the defendant's direct
testimony at trial provided that the trustworthiness of such statements satisfies legal
standards).
53 A prosecutor may not, however, use defendant's silence after Miranda warnings
as evidence of his sanity. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986) (holding
that the prosecutor's use of respondent's post-arrest, post-Miranda warnings silence
as evidence of sanity violates the Due Process Clause). Nor may a prosecutor use
statements taken in a court-ordered psychiatric examination where the Miranda
warnings were not delivered and waived. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)
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cing.54 An initial unwarned confession does not "taint" a subse-
quent confession made after proper Miranda warnings.5 Criminal
convictions will not be overturned despite the admission of a
confession taken in violation of an accused's Miranda rights if the
government establishes harmless error.5" Finally, in a bold and
sudden move dislodging years of tradition, ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
writing for a five-justice majority, held that a violation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause itself does not require a new trial if that error
was "harmless."
57
(holding that the admission of doctor's testimony violated the respondent's privilege
against self-incrimination because he was not advised of his right to remain silent
before the psychiatric evaluation).
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this issue, a
number of federal appellate courts have. See, e.g., United States v. Rojas-Martinez,
968 F.2d 415, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding co-conspirators' confessions inadmissi-
ble at trial but admissible at sentencing to determine whether or not defendant was
an organizer), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 995 (1993); United States v. Smith, 909 F.2d
1164, 1168 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding the use of post-arrest statements at sentencing
does not violate defendant's right to due process), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1032 (1991).
" See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1985) (noting that unlike a violation
of the Fourth Amendment, where the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine requires
exclusion of derivative evidence, a mere Miranda violation does not violate the Fifth
Amendment and thus does not require that fruits of an otherwise voluntary statement
be discarded as inherently tainted).
' A number of federal appellate courts have held that the introduction ofincrimi-
nating statements taken from defendants in violation of Miranda is subject to
treatment as harmless error. See Howard v. Pung, 862 F.2d 1348, 1351 (8th Cir.
1988) (finding that any error in admitting a confession made by the defendant after
his equivocal request for counsel was harmless due to the other overwhelming
evidence against the defendant), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989); United States v.
Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that the district court erred
in admitting testimony consisting of inculpatory statements prior to establishing that
the defendant had waived his Miranda rights, but holding that the error was harmless
in view of evidence showing conclusively that the defendant did indeed waive his
rights under Miranda).
" See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1263-65 (1991). Chief Justice
Rehnquist was joined byJustices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter in holding
that the introduction of a coerced confession, in violation of due process, is a "trial
error" rather than a "structural defect" and thus subject to harmless error analysis.
This holding represents a 180 degree departure from almost one hundred years of
tradition and case law, from Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532,565 (1887) (holding
that an improperly admitted coerced confession mandates new trial), to Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24-26 (1967) (concluding that although certain constitutional
errors may be harmless, the rule against coerced confessions is so basic to a fair trial
that its violation warrants automatic reversal of the resulting conviction). For a
further discussion of the effects of this case, see, for example, People v. Cahill, 853
P.2d 1037, 1060 (Cal. 1993) (Most, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion,
which relies on Fulminante, "send[s] us back to the Inquisition and the Star
Chamber"); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying
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Miranda's existence is threatened by this consistent attack at and
erosion of its borders. The Court's constant pronouncements, over
the years, that Miranda lacks constitutional exegesis have subjected
the .Court to the grave but logically compelling argument that it
lacked authority to deliver the rule in the first place. In arguing for
Miranda's reversal, a number of commentators and the pre-Reno
Department ofJustice have forcefully argued that the Court has no
authority, pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, 5 to overturn a state court criminal conviction absent a federal
constitutional violation.
5 9
The Court recently had this issue squarely before it, but chose
to sidestep the problem. In Withrow v. Williams,"° the Court
refused to extend Stone v. Powell's5' restriction on the exercise of
federal habeas jurisdiction in Fourth Amendment cases to bar a
state prisoner's Fifth Amendment claim that his conviction rested
on statements taken in violation of Miranda's safeguards. The
HarmnlessErrorto Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152,161 (1991) (critiquing the
Court's harmless error analysis, especially its insufficient recognition of certain values
in the criminal justice system).
8 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, The Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority....").
59 See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE REPORT, supra note 7, at 443 (recommending
that the Department seek to persuade the Supreme Court to abrogate or overrule
Miranda because the decision is inconsistent with the constitutional separation of
powers, has an adverse effect on the government's ability to protect the public from
crime, and is inadequate as a means of ensuring fair treatment of suspects in
custodial questioning); Grano, supra note 44, at 405 (noting that the Report
challenges the constitutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court's imposition of rules
upon the states that the Court concedes are not constitutionally mandated);Joseph
D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 174, 187 (1988) [hereinafter Grano, Constitutional Difficulties] (arguing
that Professor Schulhofer's failure to explain the source of the Supreme Court's
authority to impose prophylactic rules leaves the Miranda decision open to a
challenge of illegitimacy); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure:
A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 102-03 (1985) [hereinafter
Grano, Prophylactic Rules] (arguing that prophylactic rules are not justified by federal
common law as an implied power of the Judiciary or as an implication of federal
question jurisdiction); Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial
Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938, 938 (1987)
(defending the findings of the Department ofJustice Report, which was prepared
under his direction in his capacity as Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy).
1113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 882 (1994).
61 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (holding that federal habeas review of allegations
that a conviction rests on evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or
seizure is unavailable when a state has given the defendant a full and fair chance to
litigate a Fourth Amendment claim).
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Department of Justice argued that since Miranda's prophylactic
safeguards are not guaranteed by the Federal Constitution or
federal statute, habeas review should not extend to claims based
upon the absence of such safeguards.6 2 The majority, however,
rather than confronting this difficult constitutional issue, merely
noted that
tension results between the [federal and state] judicial systems
whenever a federal habeas court overturns a state conviction on
finding that the state court let in a voluntary confession obtained
by the police without the Miranda safeguards.... It is not
reasonable, however, to expect such occurrences to be frequent
enough ... to raise federal-state tensions to an appreciable
degree.
63
Likewise, one dissenting opinion argued that Miranda is ajudicially
created remedy, as opposed to a "true Fifth Amendment" claim,
64
but assumed without discussion that the Court had authority to hear
the claim, arguing against it on the bases of equity and judicial
administration.
Justice Souter's purported reasoning notwithstanding,65 the
62 See Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1752 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
at 14-15) (examining the Court's conclusion that habeas review should not extend to
a claim that a state conviction rests on statements obtained in the absence of
Miranda's safeguards because those safeguards are not constitutional but merely
prophylactic). A violation of federal common law would also support a habeas corpus
petition, and arguably could be the basis of a § 1983 suit. The Court, however, has
never held that Miranda is a product of federal common law. For a variant of this
position, see infra part III.C.
63 Id. at 1754-55 (five-justice majority).
"See id. at 1758-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that the question is whether violations of Miranda's prophylactic rules, which
are not true Fifth Amendment claims, should be cognizable on habeas review). The
argument that there should be no habeas because "there is no constitutional harm to
remedy," id. at 1761, applies equally to the Supreme Court's authority to review a
Miranda violation on direct appeal via a petition for certiorari.
6' The Court's holding was based on the perceived differences between the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule as outlined in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and
the Fifth Amendment's exclusionary rule articulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). In contrast to Mapp, the Court held that Miranda safeguards a
fundamental trial right in protecting a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
and facilitates the correct ascertainment of guilt by guarding against the use of
unreliable statements at trial. The Court also stated that refusingjurisdiction would
not advance the cause of federalism or ease the burdens on the federal court, as every
barred Miranda claim would resurface as a due process voluntariness claim. See
Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1755 ("We thus fail to see how abdicating Miranda's bright-line
rules ... would do much of anything to lighten burdens placed on busy federal
courts.").
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Court actually ruled as it did because otherwise there would be no
federal court review, aside from a direct appeal from the highest
state court to the U.S. Supreme Court via a certiorari petition, to
ensure that state courts and police followed the dictates of
Miranda.6 6 The Court realized the general danger of promulgating
unenforced prophylactic rules and the specific danger to the
privilege against self-incrimination posed by unwarned custodial
interrogations but was unwilling or unable to come to grips with the
tougher and more divisive issue regarding its actual authority.
Resolving this issue, in my opinion, requires either overruling
Miranda or reconstitutionalizing it.
The Justice Department and the Court have sidestepped this
same issue arising in a different context by refusing to rule on the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a), an unused federal statute
enacted in 1968, which calls for admissions of confessions in federal
court cases if voluntary, regardless of whether Miranda-type
67warnings were given. The Department ofJustice under President
Clinton specifically declined to raise this statute in a case last term
concerning a statement admitted in a United States Court of
Military Appeals, allegedly in violation of a sailor's Miranda
rights.68 In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia announced his
intention, in the next federal case involving a confession, to rule on
this statute's constitutionality, regardless of whether the Executive
chose to invoke it.69 If the Department should choose to advance
' While the Court noted that Miranda's bright-line rule lightens the burden on
busy federal courts by guiding police behavior and acknowledged that law enforce-
ment is generally willing and able to satisfy Miranda's requirements, it admitted that
there remains a need for federal collateral review of Miranda's requirements, since
"the respect [of law enforcement for constitutional guarantees] is sustained in no
small part by the existence of such review." Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1754-55.
See supra note 42. This statute provides that "in any criminal prosecution
brought by the United States... a confession... [is] admissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given." 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a). In determining the issue of voluntariness,
the judge shall consider all circumstances, including "(3) whether or not such
defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and
that any statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had
been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel." Id.
' See Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354 n.* (1994) ("We also note that
the Government has not sought to rely in this case on 18 U.S.C. § 3501 ... and we
therefore decline the invitation of some amici to consider it.").
69 Justice Scalia stated,
I am entirely open to the argument that § 3501 does not mean what it
appears to say; that it is inapplicable for some other reason; or even that it
is unconstitutional. But I will no longer be open to the argument that this
Court should continue to ignore the commands of § 3501 simply because
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this statute, or if Justice Scalia can convince a majority of other
Justices to rule on the statute despite the Department's wishes, the
question of Miranda's pedigree will soon be forced upon the Court.
B. Impossibility of Enforcing the Fifth
Amendment via § 1983 Actions
Given the Court's current interpretation of the Miranda deci-
sion, a violation of its safeguards should not constitute the basis of
a § 1983 action. Since the Miranda warnings are not themselves
constitutional mandates, it follows a fortiori that a failure to adhere
to them cannot constitute a constitutional violation. Without a vio-
lation of the Federal Constitution or federal statutes, a § 1983 claim
is groundless. 70 Moreover, the combination of various Court deci-
sions concerning doctrines associated with civil rights actions has
made it virtually impossible to successfully bring a § 1983 action for
a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause. The vast majority of
courts hearing the issue have held that a Miranda violation is not a
proper basis for a § 1983 claim. A few courts have denied summary
judgment for the defendants in such suits, however, based upon
rather strained readings of Court opinions.
1. Cases Denying a § 1983 Action
In what some commentators have characterized as outright hos-
tility to § 1983 lawsuits, 71 courts have developed a myriad of legal
and policy arguments to justify the dismissal of such actions, finding
no constitutional violation, invoking prosecutorial immunity, finding
that the official did not act under color of state law, or all three.
72
the Executive declines to insist that we observe them.
Id. at 2358.70 See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1980) (holding that § 1983 creates
a cause of action against state officials for purely statutory violations of federal law);
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978) (noting that the basic purpose of a
§ 1983 damage award is "to compensate persons for injuries caused by a deprivation
of constitutional rights").
71 See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special
Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 52-53 (1989) (arguing that legal and
policy arguments of courts, as well as the manipulation of the text and legislative
history of the statute, are a smokescreen to hide the conservative, political ideology
of the judges).
' See, e.g., Triplett v. Azordegan, 570 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1978). Ernest Triplett was
arrested, involuntarily committed to a mental hospital, and given large doses of the
drugs desoxyn and seconal by a staff physician at the institution. Shortly thereafter,
Triplett confessed to a murder, and his confession was taped. The prosecutor,
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In the area of confessions, four dominant methods have emerged.
a. A Miranda Violation Is Not a Constitutional One
The most direct method is simply to state that a Miranda viola-
tion is not a violation of the Federal Constitution and thus cannot
form the basis of § 1983 liability. This argument has a compelling
simplicity and logical appeal, and has been adopted by numerous
federal courts as a justification for dismissing § 1983 suits in cases
involving an officer's failure to adequately Mirandize a suspect. For
example, in Bennett v. Passic,3 the Tenth Circuit held in no uncer-
tain terms that failure to give Miranda warnings cannot subject a
police officer to liability under the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff
Howard Smith Bennett was arrested and then incarcerated in the
drunk tank of the city jail for about one hour when Deputy Sheriff
Adams discovered one of Bennett's cellmates in a pool of blood.
Adams testified at Bennett's criminal trial that upon questioning,
Bennett replied, "I killed the son-of-a-bitch because he wouldn't
shut up."74 After Bennett was convicted of murder, he instituted
a civil suit against the Sheriff and various state and local law
enforcement officials alleging, inter alia, that he was not warned of
Donald O'Brien, obtained the taped confession by means of an Iowa state court
order. After it was determined that the murder occurred in Plymouth County rather
than Woodbury County, the case was transferred to two other prosecutors. Injune
of 1955, the Plymouth County prosecutors played the taped confession for the jury,
and Triplett was convicted of murder. Triplett later brought a federal habeas corpus
action. The court held that Triplett's conviction was obtained in violation of due
process and ordered an evidentiary hearing. The Plymouth County court ruled that
the confession was given involuntarily and ordered Triplett's release in October of
1972, 17 years after his conviction. See id. at 821-22.
Triplett then commenced a civil action against prosecutor O'Brien pursuant to
§ 1983, which the district court dismissed on the ground of prosecutorial immunity.
The appellate court affirmed on the ground that Triplett failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. See id. at 822. O'Brien's procurement of the tape
constituted no violation of appellant's constitutional rights since he acted under
protection of a court order. See id. at n.3. Likewise, O'Brien did not use the con-
fession in such a way as to deprive appellant of his constitutional rights because
O'Brien did not prosecute the case, and O'Brien did not conceal or withhold informa-
tion from the prosecutors who did. See id. at 823. Furthermore, O'Brien's failure to
come forward with exculpatory information at appellant's trial or thereafter was not
an act under color of state law and therefore could not serve as the basis of a § 1983
action. See id. at 824.
545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1262.
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his Miranda rights prior to the custodial interrogation concerning
the murder.
75
The district court denied Bennett's motion to proceed with his
§ 1983 action on the ground that the action was frivolous, and the
appellate court affirmed.76 In responding to the charge that
Adams's failure to warn Bennett of his Miranda rights violated the
Fifth Amendment, the court noted that even assuming Bennett's
confession should have been excluded from evidence at his trial,
there was no basis for a civil rights claim for damages:
The Constitution and laws of the United States do not guarantee
Bennett the right to Miranda warnings. They only guarantee him
the right to be free from self-incrimination. The Miranda decision
does not even suggest that police officers who fail to advise an
arrested person of his rights are subject to civil liability; it
requires, at most, only that any confession made in the absence of
such advice of rights be excluded from evidence.
77
The Eighth Circuit extended this analysis to instances in which
the defendant's invocation of the rights supposedly secured by
Miranda was not honored. In Warren v. City of Lincoln,7 plaintiff
Jackson Warren appealed certain dismissals and jury verdicts for
5 See id.
76 See id. at 1264.
77 Id. at 1263. For a factually similar case reaching the identical decision, see, for
example, Williams v. Tansey, 610 F. Supp. 1083, 1085 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The plaintiff
in Williams filed a § 1983 action, alleging that two police detectives arrested him
because of his interracial marriage, searched his house and seized belongings without
a search warrant, failed to provide Miranda warnings, refused his request to be placed
in a lineup, and perjured themselves in his criminal trial. The district court granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss, reasoning that since the warnings required by
Miranda are not constitutional rights but measures designed to protect against com-
pulsory self-incrimination, failure to give warnings did not subject the detectives to
§ 1983 liability. See also Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 874 (7th Cir. 1968)
(holding that statements made by a defendant who had not been Mirandized would
be inadmissible at trial but finding no violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights); Turner v. Lynch, 534 F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (dismissing plaintiff's
§ 1983 claim against two police officers who allegedly failed "to adhere to the estab-
lished principles of the Miranda warning" and holding that plaintiff's sole remedy was
exclusion of evidence at trial); Hampton v. Gilmore, 60 F.R.D. 71, 81 (E.D. Mo.), affd,
486 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973) ("The Constitution... nowhere provides that an indi-
vidual has the right to be warned of his constitutional rights" and that failure to warn
results only in the inadmissibility of evidence at trial); Ambrek v. Clark, 287 F. Supp.
208 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (stating that "the sole import" of a failure to Mirandize is the
exclusion of evidence at trial); cf. Hensley v. Carey, 818 F.2d 646, 649-50 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987) (holding that failure to conduct a lineup does not
create liability under § 1983).
s 864 F.2d 1436 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989).
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the defendants in his § 1983 action against the City of Lincoln,
Nebraska and three Lincoln police officers, based upon an allegedly
unlawful arrest and Miranda violation. Police officers responded to
a call from "a man who claimed someone had just attempted to
break into his apartment," describing the intruder as "a slender
white male in his early twenties wearing a white short-sleeved
shirt." 9 An officer with a police dog tracked the intruder's scent
to Warren's parked car four and one-half blocks from the crime
scene. Warren, a slender, white, nineteen-year-old male wearing a
light-colored, short-sleeved shirt, attempted to drive away when the
police officer approached. Another officer flagged Warren down
and ran a check on his license. She discovered an outstanding
warrant for Warren for failure to appear on a traffic violation and
arrested him on this charge. The officer took Warren to the Lin-
coln jail complex, where he was interrogated by a detective concern-
ing a series of burglaries and sexual assaults that resembled the
attempted burglary. The detective denied Warren's requests to see
an attorney and neither he nor any other Lincoln police officer read
Warren his Miranda rights."0
The en banc panel affirmed the judgment of the district court,
holding that the officers' failure to read Warren the Miranda warn-
ings and the detective's denial of Warren's requests to see counsel
did not constitute a viable basis for a § 1983 action. According to
the court, the Miranda warnings are merely "a procedural safeguard
rather than a right arising out of the [F]ifth [A]mendment itself,"
and thus the sole remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion
from evidence of any self-incriminating statement.81
7 9 Id. at 1437.
80 See id. at 1438.
81 Id. at 1442. The court in Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Del. 1981)
reached a similar conclusion. The plaintiff, Willie Chrisco, a former officer of the
Wilmington Police Department, brought a civil rights action against Carl Williams, a
Delaware State Police Officer, and Milton Shafran, a former Delaware Deputy
Attorney General, for alleged violations of his constitutional rights during the course
of an internal investigation. After Williams and Shafran interviewed Chrisco on six
different occasions for periods of up to eight hours per meeting, a plea agreement
was reached which resulted in Chrisco's reduction of rank to patrolman with no
criminal charges filed. See id. at 1314. Chrisco alleged, inter alia, that he was
prevented from leaving during the final interrogation session, was not given Miranda
warnings, and was not permitted to have an attorney present or to discuss the
conversations with his attorney. See id.
The court held that these allegations, standing alone, did not give rise to a
damages action for violation of the Fifth Amendment because "the right to Miranda
warnings and the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation are not
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The Warren-type cases,8 2 however, can be distinguished from
the Bennett-type cases.8  In the latter cases, the police failed to
warn the defendants of their Miranda rights, whereas in Warren the
police outright refused to honor the defendant's request to speak
to an attorney. The Warren court, however, having already held that
there was no Fifth Amendment right to an attorney stemming from
Miranda, held that there had been no Sixth Amendment violation
because the right to counsel had not yet attached. 4 Although the
reasoning used by the Warren court logically flows from the reason-
ing used by courts in failure-to-warn cases, there is something
particularly unseemly and disturbing about its extension. One can
excuse the state action in the failure-to-warn cases as the product of
forgetfulness or negligence. But when the police warn a suspect of
her Miranda rights and then refuse to abide by their own recitation
of these rights, it is impossible to ascribe an innocent motive to
their conduct.
The consequence of a court's holding that a Miranda violation
is not a constitutional violation is that a plaintiff in a civil rights case
must prove that her confession was actually involuntary in the due
process sense. A failure to deliver Miranda warnings, or even a
failure to honor a suspect's invocation of these rights, does not
necessarily or even generally establish that her will was overcome.
independent constitutional rights. Rather, they are 'procedural safeguards ...
devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it .... .'" Id. at 1317 (citation omitted). As to Chrisco's right-
to-counsel claim, the court held that there was no Sixth Amendment violation because
no judicial proceedings had yet begun. See id. at 1320. Thus if Chrisco had a right
to counsel during questioning, it stemmed from the Fifth Amendment procedural
safeguards required by Miranda. But Miranda recognizes a right to counsel during
custodial interrogation only because the presence of counsel is "the adequate protec-
tive device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the
dictates of the privilege. [Th]is presence would insure that statements made in the
government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion." Mirandav.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966). Thus the Chrisco court concluded that "[flor the
same reasons that there is no action for damages for failure to advise of Miranda
warnings, there can be no civil action for denying access to counsel during custodial
interrogation." Chrisco, 507 F. Supp. at 1321.
' See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
83 See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1976); supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
' See Warren, 864 F.2d at 1442 (noting that Warren was never subjected to
criminal proceedings, which might require legal representation).
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b. The Fifth Amendment Can Only be Violated in Court
Assuming that a case involved actual and not presumed
compulsion, a court must still answer the question of when a Fifth
Amendment violation can occur before permitting a § 1983 action
to go forward. Although Miranda briefly extended the protection
of the Fifth Amendment to the station house, historically, the
privilege has applied only to courtroom or congressional testimony
given under oath.85
The Supreme Court has definitively resolved this timing issue in
two cases. In Kastigar v. United States,86 the Court held that the
government may compel an individual to speak, consistent with the
Fifth Amendment, so long as it does not use the results against him
in a criminal proceeding. Thus actual compulsion does not by itself
violate the Fifth Amendment. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
8 7
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the
search and seizure by DEA agents of property owned by a nonresi-
dent alien defendant and located in the Republic of Mexico. The
Court explained why the alien was nevertheless entitled to trial-
related rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
According to Justice Rehnquist, a Fourth Amendment violation is
fully accomplished at the moment when the unreasonable search
occurs. Since this unreasonable search occurred outside the U.S.
against a noncitizen, the Fourth Amendment was never implicated.
The Court noted, albeit in dicta, that the Fourth Amendment
operates in a different manner than the Fifth Amendment, which
is not at issue in this case. The privilege against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of
criminal defendants. Although conduct by law enforcement
officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitu-
tional violation occurs only at trial."8
' The privilege against self-incrimination has been held applicable in various
proceedings. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding the privilege applicable
in juvenile proceedings); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (statutory proceeding);
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (congressional investigations); McCarthy
v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (civil proceedings); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892) (grand jury proceedings). These cases all involved sworn testimony
in a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal. Such testimony would be admissible in a
subsequent criminal trial.
406 U.S. 441,448-49 (1972) (holding that the government's grant of immunity
to a defendant preventing the use and derivative use of a compelled statement in a
subsequent criminal trial is coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination).
87 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
" Id. at 264 (citation omitted).
1994]
440 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143:417
A number of courts have reached similar conclusions in the
§ 1983 context. For example, in Davis v. City of Charleston,9 the
court held that police officers' failure to give Miranda warnings did
not deprive a suspect of his constitutional rights because the
statements obtained during custodial interrogation were not used
against him at trial. Likewise, in Ransom v. City of Philadelphia,"0
the court held that
unless and until some use is made of an illegally obtained
confession in such a way as to deprive a person of constitutional
rights, no claim is stated under the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff may
have to await the outcome of his state court criminal proceedings
before he may base a claim upon the allegedly improperly
obtained confession. 9'
These two bars on a § 1983 action based upon a Miranda
violation-that such a violation is not a constitutional one and that
the Self-Incrimination Clause can be violated only in a criminal
proceeding-were recently combined in a Ninth Circuit opinion. In
Cooper v. Dupnik,9 2 plaintiff Clarence Cooper brought a § 1983
89 827 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 917 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 1990)
(reversing only the award of attorney's fees to police officers).
o 311 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
I' d. at 974. After reaching this conclusion, the court granted judgment on the
pleadings to the defendants. See id.; see also Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312,
1321 (D. Del. 1981). The Chrisco court held that the defendant's due process right
against use of his involuntary statement comes into play only in the context of a
criminal prosecution. See id. at 1318. Thus, the court held that unlike Fourth or
Sixth Amendment cases, in the Fifth Amendment context the exclusion of the
incriminating statements is itself the constitutional right, not the remedy for a
constitutional violation. See id. at 1317.
Professor Arnold Loewy suggests not only that a Miranda violation can never
provide the basis for a § 1983 action but that sound public policy may dictate that
police be permitted to choose not to provide Miranda warnings or to ignore the
warnings they give. See Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution:
Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence,
87 MICH. L. REV. 907, 922-23 (1989). Loewy posits that the Miranda doctrine
mandates exclusion of evidence not because the evidence was unconstitutionally
obtained and exclusion is desirable to deter police behavior, but because the
defendant has a procedural right to its exclusion at trial. See id. at 917. Thus, "courts
should not care whether or not Miranda is violated so long as no evidence obtained
from the violation is introduced against the person from whom it was obtained.
Similarly, no police officer should be subject to a law suit for obtaining a confession
in violation of Miranda." Id.
924 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Cooperl], rev'd en banc, 963 F.2d 1220
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992) [hereinafter Cooper I].
The Honorable Cynthia Holcomb Hall wrote the original panel's decision in
Cooper L The author served as ajudicial law clerk forJudge Hall at that time. The
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action93 against the Pima County Sheriff's Department and the
Tucson Police Department alleging, inter alia, a violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and his
Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.
9 4
A series of rapes, robberies, and kidnappings had occurred from
1984 to 1986 in the Tucson area.9 5 These crimes received consid-
erable media attention; the suspect was dubbed the "Prime Time
Rapist."" A joint task force of the Tucson Police Department and
the Pima County Sheriff's Department determined prior to Cooper's
arrest that they would continue to question any suspect in this
particular case despite his request for silence or for an attorney.
9 7
In fact, there was evidence that these two law enforcement agencies
had been disregarding defendants' requests for counsel, at their
discretion, since 1981.9
Cooper was arrested after a Tucson Police Department identifi-
cation technician reported (orally) that two sets of latent prints
found at the scenes of two of the Prime Time Rapist's crimes were
identified as belonging to Cooper.9 The head of the police
department's identification laboratory later rescinded this report,
admitting that it was incorrect."' 0 The officers Mirandized Cooper
opinions expressed in this Article do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Judge
Hall.
" Cooper additionally alleged nine counts under state tort law, including false
arrest, malicious prosecution, defamation, false-light invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, trespass, conversion, negligence, and conspiracy. See
Cooper I, 924 F.2d at 1525 n.4. These state law claims were dismissed, and were not
at issue in the federal appeal.
Cooper also brought a federal action for defamation, which was held proper by
the original panel and en banc court. See id. at 1535-37; Cooper II, 963 F.2d at 1235.
Finally, Cooper brought § 1983 counts for false arrest, false imprisonment, and
improper training and procedures, which the district court upheld in a summary
judgment proceeding against the appellants' assertions of qualified immunity. The
ruling on those counts was not appealed by the Pima County or City of Tucson
appellants. See Cooper , 924 F.2d at 1525 & n.5.
" See Cooper 1, 926 F.2d at 1523.
6 See id.
17 See id. The police later explained that this decision was based on a psychologi-
cal profile indicating that the rapist was "con-wise," and would demand an attorney
during an interrogation. Id. n.1.
9 See id. at 1523-24. Officers from these agencies understood that statements
obtained in violation of Miranda would be inadmissible in a criminal trial. They
believed, however, that such statements might be held voluntary and thus could be
used to impeach the defendant, to keep him off the stand, or to deprive him of an
insanity defense. See id. at 1524.
9 See id.
"o See id. The technician later admitted to his superior that he had not done a
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at his probation office and conducted a pre-arrest interview. During
this interview, the officers told Cooper that his prints matched those
found at the scenes of the two crimes, which they believed to be
true, and that his prints matched those found at another Prime
Time Rapist crime scene, which they knew to be false.01 After
half an hour, the officers placed Cooper under arrest. He then
made his first unequivocal request to speak to his attorney. 0 2 The
officers denied this request.'0 3
Cooper was transported to the Pima County Sheriff's Depart-
ment where he was interrogated for approximately four hours by
Detective Wright of the Tucson Police Department and Detectives
Barkman and Hust of Pima County. 0 4 All participating officers
were aware that Cooper had requested an attorney and that they
were violating Miranda in refusing to honor that request. 0 5
During the interrogation "Cooper was visibly upset, sometimes
angry and crying."" 6 Detective Barkman made certain derogatory
references to Cooper's Judaic background and questioned him
about his sexual practices with his wife. 0 7
Cooper was booked into the Pima County Jail that evening.1
0 8
He made another request for counsel, which was again ignored." 9
Thus, Cooper had no contact with either an attorney or his family
until the following afternoon when he was released. This release
occurred after Tucson's Chief of Police learned that the fingerprints
in issue did not belong to Cooper, that the people who had
allegedly seen the Prime Time Rapist did not identify Cooper, and
that the police department had no grounds to charge Cooper with
any crime." 0  Cooper's psychologist testified at the summary
judgment hearing that Cooper was traumatized by the interrogation
full comparison between the latent prints attributed to the Prime Time Rapist and the
known prints of Cooper. See id. at 1525. When questioned about the mistake, he
replied, "I just screwed up." Id.






107 See Cooper I, 963 F.2d 1220, 1230-31 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 407 (1992).
108 See Cooper I, 924 F.2d at 1524.
'og See id.
11 See id. at 1525.
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and suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome."' The police
never filed any charges against Cooper for the crimes of which he
was accused.'
In Cooper's subsequent § 1983 action against the two police
departments, the district court denied the defendants qualified
immunity. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
police department's failure to honor Cooper's request to remain
silent and to speak with an attorney after they Mirandized him could
not establish a Fifth Amendment violation.'1 The Cooper I court
stated that
[t]he Miranda warnings and rights are not themselves constitution-
ally mandated, but are rather procedural safeguards, or prophylac-
tic measures, to ensure that the Fifth Amendment right against
compulsory incrimination is not violated.... [Because] Miranda
requirements are not a constitutional prerequisite, their violation
cannot form the basis of a section 1983 suit.
1 4
Furthermore, the court held that a Fifth Amendment violation,
in contrast to a violation of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, does not occur until a statement is introduced against
a defendant in a criminal trial."' Since no incriminating state-
ment was taken from Cooper and no trial ensued, no Fifth Amend-
ment violation occurred." 6 The court unhappily recognized that
its holding would give police the discretion to decide when to follow
the dictates of Miranda and that the only remedy for violation would
be the exclusion of evidence at trial.117 It concluded, however,
that "if there is to be any harsher penalty imposed for a simple
violation of Miranda rights, we will have to wait for word from
Congress or the Supreme Court."'"
It should be noted here that Cooper I, like the Warren case
discussed above," 9 involved an intentional refusal to honor
Miranda, rather than a mere failure to warn. Moreover, the facts of
Cooper I were more egregious than the Warren facts: the officers
and their superiors in Cooper I planned to ignore all suspects'
"I See id. at 1524.
112 See id.
"1 See id. at 1537.
114 Id. at 1527.
"' See id. at 1528 & n.12.
116 See id. at 1528.
"' See id. at 1528-29 & n.15.
18 Id. at 1529.
11 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
1994]
444 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143:417
requests for counsel in advance of any arrests.
c. Immunities, Color of Law, Proximate Cause, and Issue Preclusion
Given that the Fifth Amendment is not violated until an
involuntary statement is used against a suspect in ajudicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding, a third major impediment to a § 1983 suit
arises. This obstacle implicates the interplay between the Fifth
Amendment timing issue and the immunities for the various state
actors involved. The confluence of these factors effectively
undermines all § 1983 actions based upon a Fifth Amendment
violation. In these cases, either the court properly excludes such
statements, or judicial and prosecutorial immunity protect those
governmental officials, while the legal doctrines of color of law,
collateral estoppel, and proximate cause protect the police officers.
It is well established that judges and prosecutors enjoy absolute
immunity from all civil suits arising out of actions that occur in a
courtroom. 2 ° This immunity protects them from any civil rights
action stemming from a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause
because such an injury can occur only during a trial. Whether the
prosecutor knew or believed the confession was the product of state
compulsion is irrelevant.'2 '
Likewise, an aggrieved suspect cannot successfully sue, the
interrogating police officer who subsequently participates in the
introduction or attempted introduction of the coerced statement.
The first obstacle is that an officer's testimony is not given "under
color of law," a requirement for a § 1983 action. For example, in
Edwards v. Vasel,'22 plaintiff James Dale Edwards sued a St. Louis
County police officer under the Civil Rights Act. Edwards alleged
that the officer testified perjuriously in Edwards's habeas corpus
120 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2613 (1993) (holding that acts
undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation ofjudicial proceedings or
for trial, and which occur in the course of her role as advocate for the State, are
entitled to the protections of absolute immunity); cf. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
228 (1988) (holding that although judges enjoy absolute immunity for judicial or
adjudicatory acts, a state courtjudge did not have absolute immunity from a damage
suit under § 1983 for his administrative decision to demote and dismiss a probation
officer on account of her gender).
121 If the prosecutor actually participated in the interrogation, she would receive
only qualified immunity from suit based upon that act. Qualified immunity, however,
would be sufficient to protect her. See infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
" 349 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 469 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1972).
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proceeding regarding whether a confession used against the plaintiff
at his trial for murder was voluntary and that as a result of this
perjury he was unsuccessful in obtaining relief.12 The court held
that Edwards had no basis to sue because even if the officer falsely
testified concerning what he had done, heard, and observed while
clothed with his official authority, the testimony was given after the
performance of his official duties and was thus not given "under
color of law."124 The defendant police officer "testified as a
witness [and iun this respect was no different than any other
witness."
1 25
Deeper consideration of this issue reveals the "fallacy of the
Edwards's court's reasoning. Its holding is plainly wrong. Since the
purpose behind custodial interrogation is to secure a confession,
and the officer is the only one present besides the defendant, it is
fully expected that the officer will eventually have to testify in court.
During my tenure with the District of Columbia United States
Attorney's Office, I was required to complete specific forms given
to Assistant United States Attorneys by the D.C. Police Department
for the purpose of calling officers into trials and suppression
hearings. These officers were paid overtime for such appearances
and disciplined if they failed to appear. Under the court's reason-
ing, however, the officer is not liable under the Fifth Amendment
for coercing a confession prior to its use in court, and, at the same
time, he is insulated from liability once the confession reaches court
because, by then, he is testifying as a mere witness and is not a state
actor.
A second method by which police officers escape civil rights
liability, regardless of whether they take the witness stand or
whether the judge rules correctly, involves the application of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. State court judgments receive res
judicata effect in subsequent federal § 1983 actions. 126 Moreover,
123 See id. at 165.
124 Id.
" Id. at 166. This reasoning would apply where the officer gave false testimony
at the original trial as well as in a habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460
U.S. 325, 335-36 (1983) (holding that § 1983 does not authorize a damages claim
against private witnesses), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983); Bennett v. Passic, 545
F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that police officers testifying as
witnesses at trial are not acting under color of state law); Williams v. Tansey, 610 F.
Supp. 1083, 1085 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that § 1983 does not create a damages
remedy against police officers for their testimony as witnesses).
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) (affording state courtjudgments the same full faith
and credit in every federal court as they have in states from which they are taken);
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the federal common law rule of preclusion is appropriately applied
to § 1983 actions. 12 7 These doctrines act to bar a civil suit based
upon an involuntary confession once the confession has been ruled
voluntary by the criminal court.
In Hickombottom v. McGuire,' an inmate convicted of armed
robbery and felony murder sued officers of the Chicago Police
Department who arrested him, alleging that they violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by denying him food
and water for an unreasonable length of time and violated his Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights not to incriminate himself by
coercing his confession. 29 The court granted the police officers'
summary judgment motion, holding that principles of issue
preclusion barred the plaintiff from pursuing his claim because the
state trial court had already explicitly found the confession at issue
to be voluntary.'3 0
Finally, the application of the doctrine of proximate causation
also prevents liability from being placed upon officers. In Gonzalez
v. Tilmer,' an inmate who had been convicted of aggravated
battery, armed violence, and attempted murder brought a § 1983
action against a police officer for allegedly coercing his confes-
Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 85 (1984) (applying the
doctrine of claim preclusion to state courtjudgments); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
95-96 (1980) (applying the doctrine of issue preclusion to state court judgments).
12 See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797-99 (1986) (extending
common-law principles of issue preclusion such that when a state administrative body
acting in ajudicial capacity resolves a disputed factual issue properly before it that the
parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate, "federal courts must give the agency's
factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's
courts").
"'8 765 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
129 See id. at 953.
'-' See id. at 954 (citing Allen, 449 U.S. at 94-105). The converse of the court's
holding regarding collateral estoppel, however, may not hold true. If a confession
were held involuntary in a pretrial suppression hearing, at trial, or on appeal, this
determination would probably not act as issue preclusion in favor of the plaintiff and
against the officers and attorney defendants in a subsequent § 1983 action. At the
time of this court determination, the prosecutor may have no motive to appeal the
adverse ruling because she could not have anticipated a subsequent § 1983 action
based upon it. She may feel that the case against the defendant is strong enough to
go forward without the statements, or that her office may not have the resources to
pursue all such appeals. Furthermore, it may be that police officers are not
considered parties to the suppression motion, and thus there could be no issue
preclusion against them. The resolution of this issue would be a matter of individual
state law under Migra, see supra note 126, and some states have stricter rules
regarding mutuality and identity of interests than others.
' 775 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Il. 1991).
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sion.13 2 The court held that the officer could not be held liable
for the introduction of allegedly coerced statements at trial because
a policeman who takes a statement is not responsible for determin-
ing whether the statement was sufficiently voluntary to be admit-
ted. 133
The Supreme Court, last term, constructed additional barriers
to such suits. In Heck v. Humphrey,14 the plaintiff alleged in a
§ 1983 damage suit that his conviction for manslaughter was a result
of malicious prosecution by the county prosecutors and a state
police investigator. Declining to rule on the unraised issue of
whether the suit was barred by resjudicata,3 5 the Court dismissed
his action. The Court held that "in order to recover damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid," a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that
his conviction was reversed by a state court on appeal or a federal
court on habeas or expunged by executive order. 3 6  Thus, to
obtain damages for time spent in prison after a criminal conviction
based upon a coerced confession, a § 1983 plaintiff (assuming she
could somehow overcome the various immunities, color of law, and
proximate causation bars) must successfully have her conviction
reversed. Since the recent application of the harmless error
doctrine to coerced confession cases, however, it is no longer true
that an unlawful confession necessarily renders a conviction invalid.
Thus, the Heck reasoning would theoretically permit a § 1983
plaintiff whose criminal conviction was not overturned solely
because of a harmless error ruling to bring an action for violation
of the Self-Incrimination Clause if an involuntary confession were
admitted in her trial. Her damages, however, would be limited to
112 See id. at 258. This plaintiff had exhausted his habeas corpus remedies. The
court found that he had waived his claim regarding his allegedly coerced statements
by failing to raise it on direct appeal. See id. at 259-60.
" See id. at 260. The court further noted that the plaintiff had procedures
available to protect his right to a fair trial, independent of any role the police played
in obtaining his statement, by simply making a motion to have the statement sup-
pressed. See id.; see also Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 942 (7th Cir.) (holding that
police officers who coerced defendant's confession were not the proximate cause of
the confession's introduction at trial because it was untenable that the officers would
foresee that the trial judge would erroneously admit the unlawful confession), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972).
134 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994).
... See id. at 2369 n.2.
I 6 Id. at 2372.
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any "actual, compensable injury, [which] ... does not encompass the
'injury' of being convicted and imprisoned." 117 This results in no
damage award at all. The Fifth Amendment violation does not
occur until trial, so there are no damages arising from the interroga-
tion itself. Once at the trial stage, there are still no damages
because the harmless error ruling means that the plaintiff would
have been convicted despite the admission of the confession.
Overall, Heck has the effect of barring suits by the guilty, those
sabotaged by ineffective counsel or by the procedural maze on
habeas, and those who discover a constitutional wrong or exculpato-
ry evidence only after release from custody.
The combination of legal doctrines discussed above appears to
unfairly deny all remedies. If the plaintiff should lose on the issue
of voluntariness at trial or in a pretrial proceeding, she will have no
§ 1983 claim because of collateral estoppel and because the officer
was not the proximate cause of the adverse ruling and resulting
injury to the plaintiff. This appears fair, for if there were no
Miranda violation there should be no remedy. On the other hand,
if a statement taken in violation of Miranda is erroneously admitted
by the criminal trialjudge, and if an appellate court subsequently
reverses on the grounds that Miranda and/or the Self-Incrimination
Clause itself was violated, the suspect would still have no § 1983
action. She cannot sue the prosecutor or judge because of absolute
and qualified immunity, and she cannot sue the officers involved
because they were not acting "under color of law" and were not the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's original conviction. This reason-
ing denies a remedy despite the existence of an actual Fifth
Amendment violation.
Likewise, if the § 1983 plaintiff should win on the issue of the
voluntariness of her confession in her criminal trial, the judge who
finds her statement to be involuntary or in violation of Miranda will
exclude the statement. The plaintiff will again have no § 1983
action because the Fifth Amendment violation will have been
avoided. The same result occurs when a plaintiff is unlawfully
interrogated but makes no statement. This unfairly denies a remedy
to both the innocent and the guilty suspect for the harm occasioned
by the unlawful interrogation itself.
1
3 7 Id. at 2372 n.7 (citation omitted).
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2. Cases Permitting a § 1983 Action
Although only one court has held that the failure of police to
honor a suspect's invocation of his Miranda rights amounts to a
Fifth Amendment violation, 138 several courts have held that where
a suspect was actually coerced by egregious police conduct into
confessing, 3 9 a § 1983 action premised upon the violation of
substantive due process was appropriate.
140
The initial such case was Duncan v. Nelson.' Plaintiff James
Richard Duncan sued six Chicago police officers for damages based
upon the alleged involuntary confession extracted by them.
142
" See infra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the Cooper I decisions).
In Dimmick v. State, 473 P.2d 616, 619 (Alaska 1970), the prosecutor introduced the
testimony of Lee Herman, who had admitted committing a robbery with the
defendant, and the defendant was convicted. The Alaska Supreme Court held that
Herman's confession was made after the police intentionally ignored his request for
an attorney. See id. The Court upheld Dimmick's conviction, concluding in dicta that
the appropriate remedy for the constitutional wrong suffered by Herman would be
a civil rights action by him against the police officers. See id. at 619-20. However, I
can find no record of such a suit ever being initiated.
"s The critical distinction here is between actual police coercion and the presump-
tion of coercion afforded a confession taken in violation of the Miranda warnings.
140 There are three pre-Miranda cases allowing a § 1983 claim based upon
physically coerced confessions. See Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 534-37 (9th
Cir. 1965) (allowing § 1983 claim by ajuvenile plaintiff based on her allegation that
the defendants unsuccessfully attempted to intimidate her into confessing to crimes
that she did not commit, with the intent to deprive her of her right to counsel, and
of inflicting mental and physical damage, in violation of Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments); Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714, 715, 717 (7th Cir. 1953) (allowing § 1983
claim where police illegally seized and searched plaintiff, subjected him to hours of
brutal interrogation in an attempt to coerce a confession, refused him the right to
contact counsel, refused to charge him with a crime or take him before ajudge, and
held him for six days); Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336,339 (N.D. Ga. 1947) (allowing
claim for violation of due process based on allegations of the successful coercion of
a confession by prolonged relays of questioning and infliction of violence, in
conjunction with confinement of plaintiff by police without either a warrant or
probable cause to arrest).
Additionally, in a prosecution brought under 18 U.S.C. § 242, a criminal statute
with requirements similar to § 1983, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
right not to be subject to punishment without due process of law was violated when
a Florida special police officer used brutal methods to beat confessions from the
suspects. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 101-03 (1951).
141 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972).
142 Two of the defendants took Duncan into custody as he was leaving Boys Court.
He was thereafter removed to an upstairs room, handcuffed to a chair, and jointly
and individually interrogated by all of the defendants for over 12 hours concerning
the murder of Samuel Schwartz. As a result of this interrogation, Duncan orally
confessed, and he signed a written confession six hours later. See id. at 940-41. This
confession was admitted at trial over Duncan's objection and in January of 1960
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Accepting as true the facts found in the Illinois Supreme Court
opinion, the district court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that, inter alia, the defendant police officers could not be held liable
for the improper acts of an Illinois state court in admitting an
involuntary confession into evidence.1 4 3 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the order of dismissal and remanded for trial. 44  It
agreed with the district court that the improper act of the trial court
in admitting the involuntary confession was not attributable to the
police officers. Thus, the police officers were not the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's imprisonment and were not liable for any
damages arising from his conviction. 45  The appellate court
construed the complaint more broadly, however, as seeking damages
not only for the nine years of illegal imprisonment and resulting lost




The Duncan court conceded that a mere violation of the
precepts of Miranda did not transform the interrogation into an
actionable tort. 47  The court found, however, that "the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibited compulsion to incriminate oneself by
fear of hurt, torture, exhaustion, or any other type of coercion that
falls outside the scope of due process. "148 Furthermore, physical
violence is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 action based on the
he was found guilty and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. See id. In December
of 1968, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the confession was involuntary and
reversed the conviction. See id. That court found as uncontroverted fact that Plaintiff
Duncan had been in custody on an unrelated charge immediately prior to his
interrogation by the defendants. See id. at 941. Furthermore, for 18 days prior to the
interrogation at issue, Duncan had been placed in the "'hole,' a form of solitary
confinement, where he slept on the floor, received one meal a day, and saw neither
family nor friends." Id. The court found that the defendant police officers knew, on
the morning of Duncan's arrest, that he had been in the "hole." See id. Duncan was
acquitted at his new trial. Id. at 940-41.
143 See id. at 940.
144 See id. at 945.
14 See id. at 942. Of course, the judge cannot be liable because of her absolute
judicial immunity. See supra note 120; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978).
146 See Duncan, 466 F.2d at 943.
147 See id. at 944.
1 Id. The Illinois Supreme Court set aside plaintiff's earlier conviction, finding
it unnecessary to reach his allegations of physical violence and threats. See People v.
Duncan, 238 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. 1968); see also Duncan, 466 F.2d at 941. Since there had
been no finding on this issue, the federal appellate court held that the plaintiff was
not precluded from presenting his proof on the issue of physical violence in his civil
rights action. See id. at 945.
MIRANDA DECONSTITUTIONALIZED
extraction of an involuntary confession.149
Two later cases followed suit. In Rex v. Teeples, 5 ° the Tenth
Circuit denied summary judgment to a district attorney and a police
officer based upon a citizen's allegation that he was denied liberty
by being placed under a seventy-two-hour mental hold and that he
was psychologically coerced into giving an involuntary confes-
sion.' The court found that both of these claims were actionable
as possible violations of substantive due process.'
5 2
Likewise, in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,53 the plaintiff filed suit
under § 1983 against the police officers and prosecutors involved in
his criminal case, alleging that they conspired to execute him even
though they knew he was innocent. 5 4 In a lengthy discussion of
149 Duncan, 466 F.2d at 945 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959) and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961)). Further
support can be found in Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Del. 1981).
Citing Duncan, the Chrisco court acknowledged that there is "some authority for the
proposition that there is a cause of action for damages for an involuntary confession
obtained by 'fear of hurt, torture, exhaustion...' or other coercion because such
police conduct offends the requirements of decency and fairness 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' imposed upon the states by the due process clause." Id.
The court dismissed the plaintiff's action because no facts supported the conclusion
that the defendants engaged in unlawful coercion intended to produce an involuntary
confession. See id.
150 753 F.2d 840 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967 (1985).
5 Plaintiff Rex had been admitted to the hospital after attempting suicide by
carbon monoxide poisoning. See id. at 841. While there, Officer Teeples represented
himself to Rex as a minister as well as a police officer and questioned him regarding
a recent kidnapping. See id. Rex alleged that Teeples convinced the attending physi-
cian to place Rex under a 72-hour mental hold because Teeples had not yet
developed probable cause to arrest. See id. at 841-42. Rex also alleged that both
Teeples andJohnson, Chief Deputy District Attorney, took turns interrogating him
for four to five hours. See id. at 842. The Colorado appellate court, in reversing
Rex's kidnapping conviction, agreed that "the police took advantage of his confused
mental state... [and] deceived him into believing [that] he was not a suspect" in a
crime. Id. (citing People v. Rex, 636 P.2d 1282 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981)).
152 See id. at 842-43.
15s 919 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 40 (1991), affd
as modified, 952 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993).
1' See id. at 1235-36. In Buckley, a highly publicized and unsolved brutal rape and
murder of a young girl coincided with the reelection campaign of the local
prosecutor. Unable to convince the first three experts, who were regularly employed
by the state, that a boot print found at the home of the victim belonged to Buckley,
prosecutors contacted a fourth expert witness, one with a reputation for fabricating
results, who agreed that the boot print matched a boot belonging to Buckley.
Buckley was tried twice for this crime. The first trial, at which this fourth expert
testified for the prosecution, resulted in a hungjury. Shortly after this trial, another
man confessed to the murder at issue. Prosecutors apparently disbelieved that
confession and were preparing for a second trial against Buckley when their expert
witness suddenly died. Charges were subsequently dismissed, and Buckley was
1994]
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the doctrine of immunity, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook held that the
prosecutor would be entitled to absolute immunity for the act of
conducting an interrogation of defendant without giving him
Miranda warnings because no Fifth Amendment violation occurs
unless and until the statements are used in a criminal proceed-
ing. 5 5  If, however, the prosecutor coerced a confession by
"depriving a suspect of food and sleep during an interrogation, or
beating him with a rubber truncheon," then the constitutional injury
is complete, and causes injury out of court.1 56 In that case, only
qualified immunity would be available. The court finally held that
the dismissal for Fitzsimmons was premature because it could not
be gleaned from the record whether Buckley was relying on Miranda
or due process.'
5-7
The Ninth Circuit, in its en banc ruling in Cooper II, took both
the Fifth Amendment and due process analyses where no court had
ever gone before. As noted above, the Cooper I court held that the
Fifth Amendment was not violated and thus no § 1983 action was
sustainable on the facts of that case.1 5' Additionally, that court
held that the conduct of the police in ignoring Miranda and in using
psychological pressure during a four-hour interrogation (in an
attempt to secure a confession from Cooper) was not conduct that
sufficiently shocked the conscience of the court so as to constitute
a substantive due process violation. 5 9 "This conduct was simply
released after spending three years in prison, unable to raise his $2 million bond. See
id. at 1234-35.
'55 See id. at 1244. The court went further than merely noting that conducting an
interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings was not a violation of a suspect's
rights. The court stated that actually "compelling" a suspect to speak, where the
compulsion does not involve practices forbidden by other constitutional prerequisites,
is likewise not a constitutional violation so long as the results are not used against the
suspect in court. See id. The Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself is an
evidentiary privilege and thus cannot be violated outside the courtroom. See id.
15 Id.
"" The Supreme Court did not address this issue in Buckley because it was not
before them. The Court simply noted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in a footnote:
The [lower] court reasoned that, because claims based upon Miranda v.
Arizona ... and the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment
depend on what happens at trial, prosecutors are entitled to absolute
immunity for those claims; by contrast, only qualified immunity is available
against petitioner's claims as to "coercive tactics that are independently
wrongful."
Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2 (citation omitted).
" Seesupra notes 93-118 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding
of Cooper 1).
159 See Cooper I, 924 F.2d 1520, 1530 & n.20 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd en bane, 963 F.2d
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not as serious as in cases in which substantive due process violations
have been found, as, for example, in the instances of serious police
brutality or deliberate indifference toward a citizen who the police
have placed in danger or to whom they owe a duty."'
The Ninth Circuit en banc panel, in a seven-one-three decision,
reversed the original panel's decision. In Cooper HI,161 the full
court held that the Fifth Amendment was violated by the police
officials coercing Cooper, after he invoked his right to remain
silent, into making potentially incriminating statements, which were
never introduced against him at trial." 2 This holding that the
Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applied to a suspect's
statements made "in the sheriffs department,"'63 and which "the
prosecution might have used at trial," 164 defies precedent 165 and
is not likely to be followed by any other circuit.1 6 6 The majority
had no case support for its position. Although it quoted long
passages from the Miranda decision that appeared to support its
position, these passages have been repudiated.'6 7 The pre-
incorporation cases cited 16 to support the claimed violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination discuss only the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus, in those cases, the
Court had no need to decide whether or when a Fifth Amendment
violation occurred.
Likewise, the post-incorporation cases cited by the majority, 6 '
1220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
11o Id. at 1530.
161 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992). David
Berkman, attorney for the defendant, noted that the case was settled in October 1993,
the day it was set for trial. Telephone Interview with David L. Berkman, Murphy,
Goering, Roberts & Berkman, P.C. (Nov. 11, 1993).
162 See id. at 1241-42.
163 Id. at 1242.
'" Id. at 1237.
165 See supra part I.B.1.b (noting that the Fifth Amendment can only be violated
in court).
" The Fourth Circuit, in dicta, has already rejected CooperIl. In Wiley v. Doory,
14 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1994), the court held that statements compelled from a
police officer by the threat ofjob loss did not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause
absent either "a compelled waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege or the use of the
compelled statements against the maker in a criminal proceeding." Finding the
Cooper H dissent "persuasive," the court dismissed the officer's § 1983 suit based upon
qualified immunity. Id. at 998.167 See supra part L.A (discussing the deconstitutionalization of Miranda).
"The Cooper II court cited to Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) and
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). See Cooper II, 963 F.2d at 1243.
169 Cooper If, 963 F.2d at 1241, 1245-47. The court cited Michigan v. Tucker, 417
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which did discuss the privilege, held only that there is a distinction
between actual compulsion and presumed compulsion, not that the
Fifth Amendment can be violated at the station house. Thus, by
ignoring the requirement that a statement be used in a criminal trial
and by defining Miranda violations as compulsion, the Cooper I
court sanctioned a cause of action based upon the Fifth Amendment
whenever Miranda is violated. 17  Second, the Cooper II court held
that substantive due process was violated both by the coercion of
non-incriminating statements and by the Task Force's unlawful plot
to deprive Cooper of the privilege of testifying in his own defense
and presenting an insanity defense. 17 1 These few exceptional
cases will not serve to protect or enforce the dictates of Miranda.
One of them, Cooper II, is simply incorrect, and the rest are actually
police brutality and not confession cases. Thus, the problem
outlined in the introduction of this Article remains unsolved.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ABANDONING MIRANDA
A suspect's "right" to receive her Miranda warnings and to have
her invocation of the rights contained in those warnings honored
has been affirmed in recent court decisions. "Beyond this duty to
inform, Miranda requires that the police respect the accused's
decision to exercise the rights outlined in the warnings. 'If the
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent .... the interrogation
must cease.'" 172 Likewise, in order to prevent police from badger-
U.s. 433, 441 (1974) ("Where the State's actions offended the ... Due Process
Clause, the State was then deprived of the right to use the resulting confessions in
court.") (emphasis added) and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 402 (1978) (holding
that a confession in a hospital bed was actually involuntary and, therefore, "[d]ue
process of law requires that statements obtained as these were cannot be used in any
way against a defendant at his trial") (emphasis added).
70 Apart from the problem that Cooper's testimony was never used in ajudicial
proceeding, the Cooper H court did not require any actual coercion of the suspect in
the due process sense. The court's assertion that there is no "cause of action where
police officers continue to talk to a suspect after he asserts his rights and where they
do so in a benign way, without coercion or tactics that compel him to speak," Cooper
II, 963 F.2d at 1244, is nonsense. Prior to this statement, the court declares that
custodial interrogation is by definition coercive and that it is a "nightmare" to have
your request for silence ignored. Id. at 1243. Thus, "benign" questioning appears
impossible.
17 See infra part II.A.
"2 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,420 (1986) (citation omitted);see also Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (holding that although police cannot reinterrogate
defendant regarding robbery offense after he asserted his right to silence, a different
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ing a defendant into waiving her previously asserted Miranda rights,
the Court last term affirmed that a suspect who has unambiguously
invoked her right to counsel cannot be questioned regarding any
offense, unless an attorney is actually present."' Such rules are
necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination,
otherwise "[w]hen a suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to
have been ignored... in contravention of the 'rights' just read to
him by his interrogator, he may well see further objection as futile
and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interroga-
tion."
74
I believe that few of us would care to live in a society in which
police officers could interrogate citizens at will for indeterminate
periods of time (in other words, revert back to pre-Miranda "third-
degree" police techniques). 7 While it is one thing to be ques-
tioned by an attorney or judge in open court (and even be com-
pelled to answer if offered Kastigar-type immunity176 ), it is quite
another to be interrogated in secret by law enforcement officials.
Confession may be "good for the soul" when given to a listener who
has your best interests at heart (such as a parent); it is certainly not
good for the body when given to those whose utmost desire is to
have you incarcerated or executed. This situation creates great
harm to the suspect, regardless of whether any statements are ever
used against him in a criminal trial. The autonomy and dignity of
detective can question defendant about unrelated homicide after new warnings are
given).
" See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (holding that only where
a suspect unambiguously requests an attorney must questioning cease, although the
"better" police practice would be to ask questions that clarify whether the request was
actually made); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (holding that once
a suspect requests counsel, police cannot reinitiate interrogation without counsel
present, whether or not the suspect consulted with counsel); Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477, 484 (1981) (holding that "when an accused has invoked his [Miranda] right
to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right
cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated
custodial interrogation").
174 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring). Souter argued for a rule
requiring officers to clarify an ambiguous request for counsel before further question-
ing. See id. at 2359. Justice Souter also referred to CooperIl, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992), as an example of police behavior
necessitating such a rule.
" Given the American public's response to the interrogation and subsequent
punishment of Michael Fay by Singaporean officials, I am less certain of this
proposition than when I began writing this Article. The elimination of the privilege
against self-incrimination would, of course, require a constitutional amendment.
17 6 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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the individual sought to be protected by the Self-Incrimination
Clause is certainly lost.
Although the Court purports to reaffirm the stability and
importance of the rights guaranteed by the Miranda decision, it has
consistently refused to provide an adequate remedy for the violation
of these rights. Given the legal obstacles to protecting the Self-
Incrimination Clause, an outright disregard for Miranda's safeguards
is precisely what is beginning to occur throughout the country. Law
enforcement officials are in the business of solving crimes, not
protecting constitutional rights. Since the values enshrined in the
Self-Incrimination Clause, in certain instances, may not further the
truth-seeking function of an investigation and trial, and since these
values certainly do not serve the adversarial goals of officers and
prosecutors, officers will be tempted to ignore them. Today's
Court, by severely limiting the remedies available for violations of
the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Miranda warnings, not only
permits officers to ignore both but actually encourages their
violation. The following consequences flow from abandoning the
remedies for a violation of the Fifth Amendment values protected
by Miranda.
A. The Contours of an Interrogation Will Be Determined
by the Executive Rather Than the Judiciary:
Some "Real Life" Horror Stories
This approach is problematic because it fails to create incentives
for law enforcement officers to comply with Miranda. The Cooper
case provides an excellent example of the response of such officers
to this lack of incentives. The most interesting aspect of Mr.
Cooper's nightmare, from a scholarly point of view, is that the
Arizona police had determined, in advance, that when they arrested
a Prime Time Rapist suspect, they would "continue to ask him
questions despite his request for silence or for an attorney."
177
They had decided "that the violent nature of the series of incidents
and public safety demanded that the police obtain more information
than following Miranda would allow."77 Law enforcement's
understanding of how present Supreme Court doctrine protects
their actions is exhibited by the statement made by Detective
177 Cooper I, 924 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd en banc, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
1'8 Id. at 1523 n.1.
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Weaver Barkman at the summary judgment hearing in the Cooper
case. He testified:
I continued the interrogation, hoping that it would be at least held
voluntary to keep him off the stand and to deprive him of the
opportunity of forming an insanity defense .... [S]o those were
my motives for violating, trampling on his civil rights and
Mirandas [sic], and the bottom line being, what are his damages.
I mean, I'm going to violate this American citizen's rights, but look
at the totality of the circumstances, the big picture, is it worth it,
yeah.
17 9
I predict numerous similar incidents will follow in Cooper Irs
wake. For example, a much publicized case in the Washington,
D.C.-Baltimore area involved the disappearance of Laura
Houghteling, a young Harvard graduate, from her mother's
Bethesda, Maryland home in 1992. Although the police conducted
extensive searches in three states and presumed the missing woman
dead, her body has not yet been recovered. Hadden I. Clark, a
homeless man who did odd jobs for Laura's mother, was arrested as
a murder suspect.' A county police department detective
testified during a suppression hearing that the police department
had intentionally decided not to advise Clark of his Miranda rights
and to ignore his requests for an attorney during a seven-hour
interrogation."18 The detective also stated that "homicide investi-
gators 'put aside our normal standard procedures for the greater
good' of possibly finding the bodies of Houghteling and other
missing persons.""8 2 Apparently, these officers determined that
this greater good necessitated ignoring Clark's "more than 100"
"" Cooper II, 963 F.2d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407
(1992); see also People v. Winsett, 606 N.E.2d 1186 (Ill. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
102 (1993). In Winsett, police administered the Miranda warnings, ignored the
defendant's unequivocal request for counsel, and obtained statements in which the
defendant incriminated himself and identified his accomplice in a murder-for-hire
scheme. See id. at 1190. While defendant's self-incriminating statements were
suppressed at trial as violative of Miranda, the fruits of the violation-in the form of
trial testimony by the accomplice-were admitted in the prosecutor's case-in-chief. See
id. at 1195. By allowing the evidence to be used in the prosecutor's case-in-chief, the
Winselt Court provides no incentive for law enforcement officials to honor a Miranda
request.
" See Veronica T.Jennings, Questioning of Suspect Defended: Police Wanted Clark
to Help Find Bodies, WASH. POST,June 9, 1993, at BI. Clark was also a suspect in the
1986 disappearance of six-year-old Michele Dorr, who likewise vanished from her
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requests for an attorney during the interrogation and threatening
Clark with "'death in the gas chamber. ' "' Although the prosecu-
tors in the case conceded that police violated Clark's legal rights
and would be barred from using Clark's statements at trial, police
officials stated that "the violations of Clark's legal rights did not
jeopardize their case against Clark because they already had enough
evidence against him" without these statements."'
As these examples indicate, if we eliminate Miranda entirely, or
simply retain its present status as a nonconstitutional prophylactic
rule with no effective remedy available for its violation, then police
officers can continue to ignore a suspect's request not to be
interrogated. 8 1 In fact, the incentive works in favor of ignoring
such a request. There is still an advantage in giving the warnings;
if a suspect agrees to waive his rights and gives a confession, that
statement might be admissible in the prosecutor's case-in-chief.
Once a suspect invokes his rights, however, his subsequent state-
ments become inadmissible anyway, and police officers have nothing
to lose by continuing the interrogation and something to gain, such
as developing impeachment evidence and other leads. Of course,
if the officers break off the interrogation and allow the suspect
access to an attorney, the possibility of obtaining a confession are
lost.
Thus, there is extreme dissonance between the content of the
warnings and the actions of the officers. It is, at best, unseemly for
the officers to offer rights which they proceed to ignore. A more
honest approach would be to formulate new warnings in light of the
limitations on Miranda. For example, the officer might say, "You do
not have the right to remain silent. If you request silence or an
'a' Id. at B2 (recounting statements made by Clark's defense attorney).
Id. Clark pleaded guilty to the murder onJune 14,1993 and was sentenced on
June 25, 1993 to 30 years imprisonment. See Veronica T. Jennings & Elisha King,
Clark Gets 30 Years for Houghteling Murder, WASH. PosT, June 26, 1993, at DI
(describing Clark's sentencing).
1"5 But these same officers still run the slight risk that a court, pursuant to Cooper
II, may declare that the statement was actually involuntary, that the taking of it was
shocking in a substantive due process sense, and that therefore a § 1983 action lies.
As noted in Cooper II:
[W]e conclude that the facts and circumstances presented by Cooper state
a cause of action under § 1983 for a violation of his right not to be
subjected during custodial interrogation to police conduct that denies him
the exercise of his "free and unconstrained will," a right to which he was
entitled by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
963 F.2d 1220, 1248 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
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attorney, the interrogation will continue, but your statements cannot
be used against you in the prosecutor's case-in-chief." This
statement, however, is not what the Court mandated in Miranda.
An analogy to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule would
be profitable. Until 1961, the Supreme Court exhibited the same
reluctance to enforce the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure as the Court presently displays
toward enforcement of Miranda rights. Prior to and during the
period when the Court held that the federal exclusionary rule
86
did not apply to the states,8 7 until twelve years later when the
Court reversed itself and held that states were bound by the
exclusionary rule, 88 many law enforcement officials in larger
jurisdictions such as California and New York disregarded with
impunity citizens' Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.8 9 Of course, the substance
" See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that evidence
taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded from federal criminal trials),
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'
8 " See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 38 (1949) (stating that 31 states then
admitted illegally seized evidence), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961) ("It, therefore, plainly appears that
the factual considerations supporting the failure of the Wolf court to include the
Weeks exclusionary rule when it recognized the enforceability of the right to privacy
against the States in 1949 ... could not, in any analysis, now be deemed control-
ling.").
"89 See, e.g., Edward L. Barrett,Jr., Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-
A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CAL. L. REv. 565 (1955). Barrett noted:
[P]rior to the [adoption of a state exclusionary rule in California] the police
were under no substantial pressure to seek clarification of [the Fourth
Amendment]. The issue of legality became crucial so seldom that the police
had, in effect, broad discretion in determining the procedures to follow,
subject only to community pressures, particularly those by the press, which
rarely focused upon any but the most obvious abuses.
Id. at 577. Other commentators have discussed the problem. For example, Judge
RogerJ. Traynor, discussing his opinion in People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955),
in which the California Supreme Court adopted the federal exclusionary rule as a
matter of state law, noted:
It became impossible to ignore the corollary that illegal searches and
seizures were also a routine procedure subject to no effective deterrent; else
how could illegally obtained evidence come into court with such regularity?
It was one thing to condone an occasional constable's blunder, to accept his
illegally obtained evidence so that the guilty would not go free. It was quite
another to condone a steady course of illegal police procedures that
deliberately and flagrantly violated the Constitution of the United States
RogerJ. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319, 322;
see also Sidney E. Zion, Detectives Get a Course in Law: They Return to Classroom to Study
1994]
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of the Fourth Amendment remains unchanged regardless of the
remedy for its violation. Thus law enforcement officials should have
been learning and obeying search and seizure rules as dictated by
the Court regardless of the existence of an exclusionary rule. This,
however, did not occur. t90 Because the Court did not enforce
these Fourth Amendment rights by providing a remedy for their
violation, many prosecutors' offices and police precincts were
unconcerned with upholding them and could not be troubled to
train their law enforcement personnel as to the content of.this
amendment.' 9 '
This natural human tendency to assume that where there is no
remedy, there must be no right,'92 is repeated in Fifth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.'9 3 If no remedy is provided for a Miranda
Court Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1965, at 50 ("'Before [Mapp] nobody bothered
to take out search warrants. Although the Constitution requires warrants in most
cases, the Supreme Court had ruled that evidence obtained without a warrant-
illegally if you will-was admissible in state courts. So the feeling was, why bother?'")
(remarks of Leonard Reisman, then New York City Deputy Police Commissioner in
charge of legal matters).
190 For an excellent discussion of this point, see Kamisar, supra note 28, at 551-69.
191 See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution:
Some Constitutional Premises and Practices in Transition, 35 VAND. L. REV. 501 (1982).
Professor Richard Uviller, a state prosecuting attorney at the time Mapp was handed
down, stated:
I cranked out a crude summary of federal search and seizure and suppres-
sion lawjust before the State District Attorney's Association convened ....
I had an instant runaway best seller. It was as though we had made a
belated discovery that the fourth amendment applied in the State of New
York ....
Id. at 502; see also Walter Mondale, The Problem of Search and Seizure, BENCH & B.
MINN., Feb. 1962, at 15. Mondale states:
The very fact that these [post-Mapp] institutes are being held is eloquent
testimony.., of the basic wisdom of the Court's decision. We are doing
today, because of the Court's ruling, what we should have done all along.
We are studying ways in which we can bring our police methods and
procedures into harmony with the constitutional rights of the people we
serve.
Id. at 17.
1"2 See Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionay Rule in Search and Seizure,
49 UMKC L. REV. 24 (1980). Loewenthal, an Associate Professor of Law and
CriminalJustice atJohnJay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New
York, reported the findings of a study of New York police perceptions about the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. See id. at 29. The study found that "police
officers could neither understand nor respect a Court which purported to impose
constitutional standards on the police without excluding evidence obtained in
violation of those standards." Id.
"' One could argue that these Fourth and Fifth Amendment situations are not
analogous because presently statements taken in violation of Miranda are excluded
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violation, officers will simply stop offering and honoring these
warnings. If there is no remedy for a Fifth Amendment violation,
officers will discover this as well and ignore the Fifth Amendment.
Thus, in regard to the Self-Incrimination Clause, we are in danger
of the same kind of lawlessness that we experienced toward Fourth




B. Inappropriateness of a Right Without Remedy
If there exists, as the United States Supreme Court claims, a
right to be free from interrogation in the absence of Miranda
warnings and/or a right to have one's invocation of the right to
remain silent or to consult with an attorney respected,"'5 then at
present this is a right without a remedy. 96 Allowing a civil rights
remedy of either damages or injunctive relief would protect both
innocent and guilty victims from brutal police practices.
1 97
from a prosecutor's case-in-chief, while in pre-Mapp days, evidence taken in violation
of the Fourth Amendment was not excluded. Nevertheless, the basis for the analogy
survives. In the Fifth Amendment context, police officers benefit from ancillary use
of the excluded statements and can still proceed with their case without using these
statements in their case-in-chief. In the Fourth Amendment context, however, the
case is usually dismissed if the prosecutor cannot use the physical evidence in his
case-in-chief. Therefore, in the Fourth Amendment arena, the exclusionary rule gives
police officers a reason to obey the law, whereas in the Fifth Amendment situation,
it does not.
1N We are, in fact, in some danger of reexperiencing this same Fourth Amend-
ment lawlessness today. The Court has deconstitutionalized the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule as well, holding that it is no longer a constitutionally required
remedy but merely a method to deter improper police behavior. See Ruth W. Grant,
The Exclusionary Rule and the Meaning of Separation of Powers, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 173,193-96 (1991) (arguing that under a unitary model of criminal prosecution
the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required by the Fourth Amendment and due
process); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484-86 (1976). Thus, the Court's
source of authority for imposing the exclusionary rule on the states is of dubious
origin.
195 See supra notes 172-74.
1 6Actually, there is a partial remedy for those who are charged-the exclusion of
the statement from the prosecutor's case-in-chief. See supra note 186 (noting a case
in which this exclusionary rule was recognized). Even this inadequate remedy,
however, is unavailable to uncharged suspects.
197 One commentator posits that courts are opposed to the frequent unfairness of
money damages in § 1983 suits and suggests that unlawful police practices are better
resolved by injunctions against police departments. See Christina Whitman, Constitu-
tional Torts, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 5, 60 (1980) (arguing that individual officials may only
be following orders of superiors, thus it makes more sense to blame the government
institution and force it to change). Presently, "the inadequacy of police training may
serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the [municipality's] failure to train
[its officers properly] amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
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Although in a civilized society reasoned considerations of justice
should apply to all members equally, there is visceral appeal in
protecting those innocent of wrongdoing. By most accounts, only
fifty percent of those arrested (and presumably interrogated) are
convicted.19 While many of these releases may be due to insuffi-
cient evidence or procedural or witness-related problems rather
than actual innocence, surely some number of truly innocent people
get caught in this net. For those who do not go to trial for the
crime about which they were interrogated, "it is damages or
nothing." '"9
C. Maintaining Miranda's Symbolic Value
Miranda is symbolic of our societal commitment to the Constitu-
tion and to criminal procedural guarantees;. 0 it accomplishes this
whom the police come into contact," and this policy causes a constitutional injury to
a plaintiff. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). In order to have a
viable § 1983 claim against a municipality, however, a state actor must first commit
an underlying constitutional violation. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978) ("Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless
action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional
tort."). Thus, a municipality currently cannot be held liable for a Miranda violation
committed by one of its officers.
In any case, even where the police department or municipality can be held
responsible for a constitutional violation, the remedy is generally limited to damages
rather than injunctive relief. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105
(1983) (reversing the grant of an injunction against the Los Angeles police
department for the use of "chokeholds" due to the lack of evidence suggesting that
the civil rights plaintiff would again be arrested and subjected to a chokehold).
'9 See Brian Forst, Criminal Justice System: Measurement of Performance, 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME ANDJUSTICE 479,481 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (noting
that the conviction rate is approximately 50%, based on the ratio of convictions to
arrests, including cases that are unworthy of prosecution); see also YALE KAMISAR ET
AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 12 (7th ed.
1990) ("[T]he cases against 30-50% of all arrestees will be dropped as a result of
[prosecutorial] screening.").
"' Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
200 See Caplan, supra note 28, at 1471. Caplan has stated:
For its supporters, Miranda is a gesture of government's willingness to treat
the lowliest antagonist as worthy of respect and consideration. They have
a point. There is something attractive about a legal system that insists that
suspects have a right to refuse to answer police inquiries, that imposes on
the police an obligation to communicate that right, and that provides
counsel to the indigent. The Fifth Amendment, as much as any constitu-
tional provision, illustrates that ours is a limited government. It reflects an
historic distrust of authority.
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with very little cost in terms of lost convictions. 201  In fact, al-
though a number of studies show a reduction in statements
obtained during custodial interrogation immediately following the
implementation of the Miranda rules, 20 2 various other authors
refute these statistics. More recent empirical analyses show no
decrease in the overall number of convictions.2 03 Allowing a
federal cause of action under § 1983 for a violation of the Miranda
warnings would signify a federal commitment to Fifth Amendment
values.2 0 4  In fact, given the permeation of these warnings in
American popular culture, a failure to offer a civil rights action
itself sends out a loud and definitive message.
Moreover, this symbolism is not lost on police officers, who, of
course, are subject to the same cultural messages as other citizens.
As noted by Professor Dripps, who is no fan of the privilege:
201 See Schulhofer, supra note 28, at460 ("[A]s things have turned out,Miranda did
accomplish something, and it did so at surprisingly little cost."). One author has
suggested that an empirical study be conducted to assess the effect that expanded
§ 1983 liability would have on state and local governments. See Beermann, supra note
71, at 95 (suggesting that empirical evidence is necessary to enable courts to balance
the competing interests of maximizing compensation to the victim and ofallowinglaw
enforcement officers to perform effectively, lest judges look to their own political
views).
202 See e.g., DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE REPORT,supra note 7, at 511 n.218; Controlling
Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaty, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-01,
204-06 (1967) (describing Philadelphia study finding that refusal to make a statement
increased from 32% to 59% after Miranda); id. at 1120, 1123 (describing New York
study finding that percentage of non-homicide felony cases presented to grandjuries
involving admissions fell from 49% to 15% followingMiranda); Richard H. Seeburger
& R. Stanton Wettick,Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV.
1, 11 (1967) (finding a 16.9% decline in the confession rate).
203 See LivA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND PoIxrIcs 180-81, 403-05 (1983)
(describing summaries of studies that found decreasing confession rates for the first
year or so after the Miranda ruling but found that conviction rates returned to their
former levels one year later); see also ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINALJUSTICE IN A
FREE SOC'Y, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 5 (1988) (finding that Miranda did not
"significantly handicap police and prosecutors in their efforts to arrest, prosecute, and
obtain convictions"); Kamisar, supra note 28, at 585 n.164 (listing empirical studies
on the impact of Miranda).
2 o As Professor Whitman noted,
[T]he function of a "supplementary" federal cause of action under section
1983, and of allowing plaintiffs to pursue such action in federal court, is
largely symbolic. But symbolism is important in our federal system, where
the lines between nation and state are significant but difficult to define.
Even where state relief exists it makes a great deal of sense to provide a
federal cause of action, and federal jurisdiction, in order to affirm those
rights that the federal government believes to be of special importance.
Whitman, supra note 197, at 24.
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[T]he warnings have contributed generally to a more humane
police culture, and they surely impose some limits on police tactics
in specific cases. The reading of rights affects the questioner, even
if it glances off the suspect. Only a corroded conscience could live
with reading the Miranda card by the glare of the arc lamp. And
the law-abiding police interrogator must tread rather lightly; too
much pressure and the suspect may invoke the right to coun-
sel.
2 05
Finally, Miranda's exclusionary rule is a symbol of the Court's
refusal to condone the unlawful conduct that produced the
confession. This "judicial integrity" rationale posits that a court
ought to nullify a constitutional violation rather than admit the
evidence and thereby permit the government to profit by its
wrongdoing. Such denial of court assistance in perpetuating the
violation is necessary to maintain respect for the Constitution and
to preserve the judicial process.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
An extensive scholarly debate has taken place regarding the
legitimacy of Miranda's prophylactic rules in particular and of
prophylactic rules in general. The resolution of this debate in favor
of legitimacy and a reconstitutionalization of such rules would be
the best method for protecting the Self-Incrimination Clause. It
would allow a § 1983 action based upon a Miranda violation or
involuntary confession and put to rest the Article III legitimacy
concerns that arise when federal courts overturn state court criminal
convictions based upon Miranda violations. I will discuss this option
last.
Other methods for accomplishing this objective without
overturning Supreme Court precedent include refining the law
surrounding substantive due process and Fourth Amendment
05 Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward
a Unified Themy of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23"U. MICH. J.L. REF. 591, 632
(1990) (footnote omitted). "But those concerned with official abuse of the innocent
will not wage war against Miranda. If the alternative to Miranda is the old
voluntariness test, they will count themselves amongMiranda's staunch supporters."
Id. at 634 (footnote omitted); see also Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to
Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1986) ("Miranda's symbolic value not only
has produced a better atmosphere for people who come in contact..;vith the police but
also may have made a tangible contribution toward curbing abusive police
practices.... [O]verruling Miranda would convey the message that restraints on
police interrogation have been largely abandoned.").
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jurisprudence. The latter two solutions, while not as promising or
encompassing, would eliminate the primary obstacles to basing a
§ 1983 action on the Fifth Amendment-that the Self-Incrimination
Clause cannot be violated until the statement is used in court and
that police officers are not the proximate cause of the admission of
such evidence.
A. The Due Process Clause
One potential solution to the deconstitutionalization of Miranda
is to concede, as argued in this Article, that neither the Miranda
decision nor the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause
provides the basis for a § 1983 action, and instead turn to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for guidance.
This was the path chosen by the Cooper II court, which adopted
the theory that substantive due process "flatly prohibits coercion in
the pursuit of a statement."" 6 This theory is flawed, however,
because it fails to distinguish between substantive and procedural
due process, and it fails to distinguish between the standard for
finding a confession to be involuntary and the standard for finding
a substantive due process violation. Most, if not all, coerced
confession cases are procedural due process cases.10 7 The process
that is due a defendant before a State can deprive her of liberty
through a criminal conviction is a fair trial.0 A fair trial is one
that, among other things, is free of coerced confessions. Nothing
in the Constitution prohibits the taking of the confession. In fact,
the Government can compel statements in many circumstances; it
simply cannot use them against the speaker in a criminal proceed-
ing.2 0 9 Consequently, most trial and trial-related rights contained
206 Cooper I, 963 F.2d 1220, 1244 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407
(1992).
2'7 These cases hold that a due process violation occurs not when the confession
is taken but when it is used in court. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,
516 (1963) (determining 'whether the circumstances under which the confession was
made were such that its admission into evidence amounts to a denial of due process")
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959)
(presenting the question of whether the defendant's "confession was properly admitted
into evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment") (emphasis added). Furthermore,
these cases never used the words "substantive due process."
" See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens,J., concurring)
('[I]t is a guarantee of fair procedure, sometimes referred to as 'procedural due
process': the State may not execute, imprison, or fine a defendant without giving him
a fair trial .. ").
20 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448-49 (1972) (holding that it is
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in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments are procedural
rights, mandating what steps a State must take before incarcerating
an individual.2 1
Substantive due process, on the other hand, protects a right
deemed to be so "fundamental" that the State cannot deprive an
individual of it without a compelling justification, which in practice
generally means that no procedure will suffice to allow the depriva-
tion."' The best known modern examples in which state police
appropriate to compel testimony if speaker is granted immunity); see also New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 664 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring) ("Miranda has never
been read to prohibit the police from asking questions to secure the public safety.
Rather, the critical question Miranda addresses is who shall bear the cost of securing
the public safety when such questions are asked and answered: the defendant or the
State.").
210 See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1012-20 (1988) (holding that a defendant
in state criminal proceedings has a Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse
witnesses, as the Confrontation Clause is essential to the fairness of trial and ensures
the integrity of the fact-finding process); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988)
(holding that a defendant has a right to present witnesses in her own defense under
the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (noting that a defendant has a right to effective assistance
of counsel); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in criminal proceedings is required by fundamental fairness
inherent in the Due Process Clause to ensure presumption of innocence and reduce
risk of convictions resting on factual error); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968) (declaring that the right to jury trial is fundamental to the American scheme
ofjustice); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (finding a due process right to
have the prosecutor disclose material exculpatory evidence); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that an indigent defendant in a criminal trial has
a fundamental right to assistance of counsel).
21 Although the Due Process Clause originally and literally protected only the
procedure by which a state may deprive an individual of liberty or property, the Court
has also used it to scrutinize the substance of state statutes. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (striking down an Oregon statute that required
all children ages eight through sixteen to attend public rather than parochial schools
as a violation of parents' liberty interest in raising and educating their children);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down a Nebraska statute that
prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to any child below grade eight as a
violation of teachers' liberty interest in practicing their profession, children's liberty
interest in acquiring knowledge, and parents' liberty interest in supervising their
offspring); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down a New York
statute that prohibited the employment of bakery workers for more than 60 hours per
week as a violation of citizens' liberty interest in employment).
In response to the perceived evil of the Lochner era, which allowed the Court to
act as a "super-legislature," the Court limited substantive due process to individual
rights either (1) specifically contained in the language of the Constitution itself,
generally the first eight amendments, or (2) otherwise deemed by the Court to be
"fundamental." Thus, while civil rights actions against state actors may be termed due
process or even substantive due process violations, most are actually violations of a
more specific constitutional provision incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment,
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action was censured by the Supreme Court on what has been
interpreted to be substantive due process grounds involved
torture212 and stomach pumping.213 Where a substantive due
process violation is found, a plaintiff may invoke § 1983 regardless
of the availability of a state remedy, for "the constitutional violation
is complete as soon as the prohibited action is taken."214 In many
cases, however, although there is a deprivation of a recognized
and thus fit into category (1). In this section of the Article, all references are to
category (2), which I will call "pure" substantive due process rights. These rights are
not specifically mentioned in any constitutional clause. Pure substantive due process
can be violated by either legislative enactments, as in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-
56 (1973) (striking down a Texas statute that prohibited abortions as violative of the
right to privacy), or by nonlegislative executive action, as in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (overturning criminal conviction for possession of morphine
based on evidence obtained through forcible pumping of defendant's stomach).
The Court itself has distinguished between what I call "pure" substantive due
process and procedural due process as follows:
So-called "substantive due process" prevents government from engaging in
conduct that "shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,172
(1952), or interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
Palho v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325-326 (1937). When government action
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due
process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner. Matthew v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). This requirement has traditionally been
referred to as "procedural" due process.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
212 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In this case, the Court
stated that the criminal convictions based upon confessions obtained by severely
whipping the defendants offended the fundamental traditions and conscience of
society and that the trial based upon this unreliable evidence was a farce. Neverthe-
less, the Court's holding in Brown v. Mississippi was merely that "the use of the
confessions.., obtained [through physical torture] as the basis for conviction and
sentence was a clear denial of due process." Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
213 See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-73 (stating that state court conviction cannot be
secured by methods that shock the conscience). It is far from clear, however, that this
was actually a substantive due process case. It is clear that it would not be one today.
Rochin was decided after the Fourth Amendment was incorporated into the
Fourteenth and made applicable to state court criminal proceedings in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), but before the exclusionary rule was made mandatory
in state criminal proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wofl.
The Court noted the anomaly that if Mr. Rochin had been forced to confess, his
statement would be excluded, but when an equal amount of force was used against
him to secure physical evidence, such evidence was admitted. The Court turned to
the general notion of justice embodied in the Due Process Clause because it had
nowhere else to turn.
If Rochin were brought today, of course, the Court would exclude the evidence
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. Both today and in 1952, Mr.
Rochin had a valid § 1983 action based upon a Fourth Amendment violation, which
occurred when his stomach was pumped, not when the evidence was introduced.
214 Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 338 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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property or liberty interest, the Court has held that the procedure
due is merely to disallow any evidence obtained by these depriva-
tions in court or to provide a state tort or criminal law remedy.
Thus, in most due process cases, a § 1983 claim is not stated. 15 In
other words, unlawful conduct by state officials does not rise to the
level of a substantive due process violation. Most reasonable
persons would agree, however, and recent Supreme Court cases
concerning the Fourth and Eighth Amendments hold, that in the
case of actual police brutality, the "constitutional line" has been
crossed, and, therefore, a § 1983 action is available, regardless of
alternative remedies.
216
Due to the subjective nature of the test used to establish a
violation of substantive due process and the lack of definition as to
the contours of the right, there is no objective method for determin-
ing when any particular action has crossed this roving "constitution-
al line."217 To determine if a state actor's conduct that coerces a
215 See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981) (noting that although
respondent prisoner was deprived of property under color of law, he did not suffi-
ciently allege a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
state a claim under § 1983 because Nebraska had a tort claim procedure that
provided an adequate post-deprivation remedy), overruled on other grounds by Daniel,
474 U.S. 327 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676-80 (1976) (observing that
although personal security is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, plaintiffs had no § 1983 action against their public school teacher for corporal
punishment delivered without a prior disciplinary hearingbecause the plaintiffs have
a state tort damage claim and defendant may be subject to state criminal penalties if
that punishment is later found to be excessive); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701
(1976) (holding that a citizen's liberty interest in preserving his or her reputation is
insufficient to trigger the protection of the Due Process Clause to support a § 1983
action in a case where police circulated a picture of the plaintiff along with his name
and the words "active shoplifter"); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,540-41 (1961)
(stating that due process prohibits the admission of involuntary confessions and
requires the reversal of state convictions based upon such admissions).
216 No procedure would justify the unnecessary beating of an arrestee by the
police or of a convicted prisoner by a guard. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995,
1000 (1992) (holding that malicious and sadistic punching and kicking of handcuffed
convicted prisoner by state guards would violate Eighth Amendment despite the fact
that the inmate did not suffer any serious injuries as a result); see also Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that unreasonable use of excessive force
in effectuating arrest would violate Fourth Amendment). Because specific constitu-
tional provisions are violated at the time of the state action in such cases, those
plaintiffs are not invoking procedural due process. Thus, the court did not consider
whether postdeprivation tort remedies provided adequate procedural protection. In
my opinion, it would be ludicrous to say that while arrestees and convicted prisoners
are protected from physical abuse by state actors, post-arrest, preconviction citizens
living in states that provide alternative tort remedies for such beatings would not be
protected by § 1983.
217 For an interesting discussion on this point, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some
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confession violates substantive due process, then, one must first
decide whether his actions are as egregious as police brutality, so
that the Court's conscience is shocked and a § 1983 action is
appropriate, or whether his conduct is something less, perhaps
more akin to state-sponsored defamation, corporal punishment, or
the violation of a procedural rule, such that either the court's con-
science is not shocked and/or a state tort action or suppression
ruling is all the procedure due the affected individual.21
In addition to the few courts that have found a substantive due
process violation in the confession context, 219 some circuit courts
have found substantive due process violations where police
action-or inaction where the state had an affirmative duty to
act-compromised an individual's right to "bodily integrity."
221
Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 309, 324 (1993) (noting that "no agreed framework has emerged for
identifying when relatively isolated official acts offend substantive due process,"
although "[t]he Court has established that conscience-shocking action violates due
process").
211 For example, in Ingraham, the Court ruled only on the Eighth Amendment and
procedural due process claims, leaving open the possibility of bringing a § 1983
substantive due process claim on the same facts. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 679 n.47
("We have no occasion in this case ... to decide whether or under what circumstanc-
es corporal punishment of a public school child may give rise to an independent
federal cause of action to vindicate substantive rights under the Due Process
Clause."); see also id. at 689 n.5 (White,J, dissenting) (arguing that the Court should
amend the grant of certiorari and set the case for reargument on a substantive due
process theory). Likewise, in a concurring opinion criticizing the Parrati Court's
reliance on procedural due process, Justice Powell noted that "[t]he Due Process
Clause imposes substantive limitations on state action, and under proper circumstanc-
es these limitations may extend to intentional and malicious deprivations of liberty
and property, even where compensation is available under state law." Parratt, 451
U.S. at 552-53.
219 See, e.g., CooperII, 963 F.2d 1220, 1249 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 407 (1992); Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840,843 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967
(1985); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894
(1972). See generally supra notes 141-70 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding that a police officer who severely injured an innocent driver during
a high-speed chase did not violate substantive due process because his conduct,
although "lacking in judgment, [fell] short of the 'shocks the conscience' standard"),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1172 (1992); Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7 (lst Cir.) (holding
that a police officer's refusal to let two young children kiss their stepfather before he
was taken into custody, although "despicable and wrongful," did not "shock the
conscience"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 226 (1991); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583,
588, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a police officer who acted with deliberate
indifference by impounding the plaintiff's car and then leaving her "by the side of the
road at night in a high-crime area" violated substantive due process where the
plaintiff was ultimately raped as a result of the defendant's carelessness), cert. denied,
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The Supreme Court has likewise offered the possibility of § 1983
actions based upon substantive due process in cases involving the
loss of personal security or liberty.
221
I suggest that the taking of a confession that is actually involun-
tary, and not just in contravention of Miranda, would violate
procedural due process if used in court, but in many instances
would not so shock the conscience of the court that substantive due
process would be violated at the time the confession was taken.
222
The interrogation of a suspect does constrain his liberty, but it is
not taking liberty without due process so long as the officer had a
warrant or probable cause to arrest. 22 In fact, it is the officer's
498 U.S. 938 (1990); Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that a public school teacher's decision to discipline a student, "if accomplished
through excessive force and appreciable physical pain," may violate substantive due
process if the teacher acted with the intent to cause harm); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d
534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986) (indicating that a police officer who intentionally threatened
a suspect with his vehicle might violate substantive due process if his actions
"amounted to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience"); White v.
Rochford, 592 F.2d 381,383 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that a police officer's refusal to
help three small children left alone in an automobile after the officer arrested the
driver amounted to a deprivation of substantive due process "where that refusal
ultimately result[ed] in physical and emotional injury to the children").
22 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 876, 878-79 (1993) (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the execution of an innocent defendant is an arbitrary
imposition on liberty which shocks the conscience); Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct.
1780, 1809 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislation permitting
continued confinement of an insanity acquitee until she can demonstrate that she
poses no danger to society does not shock the conscience); Collins v. Harker Heights,
112 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (1992) (holding that city's failure to train or warn its employees
about known hazards beneath the city streets, resulting in death by asphyxia in a
manhole, was not sufficiently arbitrary or conscience-shocking to violate substantive
due process); DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189,197 (1989) (holding that
substantive due process guarantee against state deprivation of safety and security does
not apply to social workers who have no affirmative constitutional duty to prevent a
parent from abusing her child, even where state employees receive numerous reports
of abuse); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (holding that the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 that authorizes pretrial detention is not punishment before trial
but rather a permissible regulation preventing danger to community); Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding that involuntarily committed patients at
state mental institution had a substantive due process interest in reasonably safe
conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraints, and minimally adequate
training).
' The Fourteenth Amendment provides procedural protection by disallowing the
confession at trial. Furthermore, certain state tort remedies such as false imprison-
ment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault and battery may be
available, depending on how the confession is secured.
2 The Court has stated that the deprivation of liberty occasioned by an arrest
does not trigger the strict judicial scrutiny of substantive due process because the
system provides adequate procedural controls such as warrants and judicial
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job to attempt to secure a confession.22 4 Furthermore, the stan-
dard for finding a confession to be involuntary is much lower than
the "shock the conscience" substantive due process standard used
by the Cooper II and most other courts. Although some coercion by
the interrogating officer is required, 225 a confession can be ren-
dered involuntary because of the particular susceptibility of the
suspect, for example his youth, education level, and physical
characteristics. 226 Thus, in certain cases, a very small amount of
pressure may result unforeseeably in an involuntary confession.
Of course, in some instances the coercion becomes so acute that
it is indistinguishable from police brutality, such as when an officer
literally beats a confession out of a suspect. At that point, the state
action shocks the conscience and should be deemed a constitutional
violation capable of supporting a § 1983 action, whether or not the
resulting confession is ever used in court. I submit that such a
point was not reached in the Cooper case, as Mr. Cooper's will was
never overborne (he never confessed), and no physical or unusual
psychological pressure was used.
In addition to the legal flaws outlined above, the following
problems are worth noting. The Supreme Court highly disfavors
expanding the reach of substantive due process.2 27 In isolating a
determinations of probable cause. See e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 679-80
(1977).
224 The Court has acknowledged society's "need for police questioning as a tool
for the effective enforcement of criminal laws. Without such investigation, those who
were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might wholly escape
prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (citation omitted).
Although the Cooper II court was shocked by the police plan to violate Miranda
in order to obtain statements that they could use to keep the defendant off the stand
and to deprive him of a potential insanity defense, the Supreme Court has blessed
this precise use of statements taken in violation of Miranda. Indeed, statements taken
in violation of Miranda are regularly used this way in our criminal justice system with
no constitutional consequences. See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text. Thus,
these police officers were simply making clever use of Supreme Court decisions that
specifically permitted their behavior.
2 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that "coercive
police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'volun-
tary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause").
"'6 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 n.2 (1991); Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226 (1972) (listing some of the factors that the Court has
considered in determining whether a confession was truly voluntary, including "the
youth of the accused, his lack of education, [and] his low intelligence") (citation
omitted).
2' See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992). In Collins,
the Court stated:
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constitutional violation in any § 1983 suit, the Court rightly favors
the use of specific provisions in the Bill of Rights over more general
notions of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.228 A
substantive due process claim, basically a claim that one was treated
in a thuggish manner, is much narrower than a Fifth Amendment
Self-Incrimination Clause claim. Since the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause was not violated, it appears disingenuous to
bootstrap the compelled statement claim through a substantive due
process analysis.
The second, more practical disadvantage with a substantive due
process approach is that the Court will be required to engage in the
same case-by-case analysis it used to determine the voluntariness of
pre-Miranda confessions. Of course, the Court may still, under
certain circumstances, be required to determine actual voluntari-
ness, but Miranda provides the convenient presumption that the
confession was voluntary (if followed) or involuntary (if not
followed). Determining voluntariness is extremely difficult without
the aid of the presumption and constitutes an unmanageable drain
on judicial resources.
229
Moreover, deeming all involuntary confessions to be violative of
substantive due process would provide insufficient guidance to
police as to what constitutes acceptable behavior, an issue that was
resolved by Miranda's bright-line rule prior to its deconsti-
tutionalization. As a result, police may cease all custodial interroga-
tion rather than run the risk of being found civilly liable. For
example, the Court's most recent holding that a confession was
involuntary was premised, in part, on the Court's finding that the
defendant possessed low-average to average intelligence, dropped
As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because [the] guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended. The
doctrine ofjudicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.
Id. at 1068 (citation omitted); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986)
("There should be ... great resistance to expand the substantive reach of... [the
Due Process Clause], particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
deemed to be fundamental.").
22 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that "all claims that
law enforcement officers have used excessive force.., in the course of an arrest...
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard,
rather than under a 'substantive due process' approach").
" Additionally, substantive due process would apply only if there were actual
coercion, not a mere denial of Miranda. This theory would fail to offer a § 1983
cause of action for a Miranda violation, even if done purposefully.
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out of school in the fourth grade, was short of stature and slight of
build, and had not in the past adapted well to the stress of prison
life.2"' The Court also found that an informant's position as
defendant's friend might well have made the defendant particularly
susceptible to the informant's entreaties." These are factors
which the police officer cannot control and of which she may have
no knowledge at the time of the interrogation. Thus the officer will
be unable to predict whether a judge, having before her all of the
appropriate information, will subsequently determine that the
confession was involuntary. It would be unfair to hold this officer
liable for money damages, then, based solely upon this confession.
I suggest that Miranda's bright-line rule is necessary so that police
know at the time of the interrogation exactly what procedure to
follow.
The only method I can envision that would allow a § 1983
action, while escaping some of the problems with this analysis, is a
less rigorous substantive due process test that nonetheless provides
guidance to police officers. Presently, the standard to determine
whether substantive due process is violated changes depending upon
the circuit, who the victim is, who the violator is, and the circum-
stances surrounding the violation.2 32 The Supreme Court may
countenance the use of a less stringent standard by analogy to the
language in cases holding that the government owes a greater duty
to those people whom the State has deprived of their liberty. For
example, there is no state duty to protect children from parental
abuse 23 3 or to provide safe working conditions to city employ-
ees. 234 However,
"a See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 n.2 (1991).
2s1 See id. The Court's holding was also based on the findings that the defendant
was in danger of physical harm at the hands of other inmates and that the FBI
informant promised to protect him upon condition that he confess.
232 Compare Cooper IT, 963 F.2d 1220, 1248 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 407 (1992) (using Rochin's "shocks the conscience" test); Temkin v. Frederick
County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716,720(4th Cir. 1991) (applying"shocks the conscience"
standard in police pursuit cases), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1172 (1992) and Checki v.
Webb, 785 F.2d 534,538(5th Cir. 1986) (applying"shocks the conscience" test where
police officer intentionally used his car to terrorize motorist) with Fagan v. City of
Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying relatively lenient "deliberate
indifference" test in an action against a city's allegation of a substantive due process
violation in a police pursuit case).
" See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197-98
(1989) (rejecting the argument that the State acquired an affirmative duty, enforce-
able through the Due Process Clause, to protect a child from his father).
231 See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1065 (1992) (rejecting
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the State owes a duty to take care of those who have already been
deprived of liberty. [The Court has] held, for example that.., the
Due Process Clause of its own force requires that conditions of
confinement satisfy certain minimal standards for pretrial
detainees, for persons in mental institutions, for convicted felons,
and for persons under arrest.
23 5
Those being interrogated thus deserve a higher degree of
protection from the State because their liberty has been curtailed by
it. The corresponding duty of the State may be to provide Miranda
rights to all suspects or at least to refrain from intentionally
ignoring a suspect's request for an attorney or to remain silent.
Such a solution would overcome virtually all of the obstacles to
enforcement noted in Part II of this Article. Substantive due
process is a constitutional requirement, not a prophylactic rule, and
is violated immediately regardless of later court use of any evidence
collected via the violation. The offending officer's actions would be
under color of law when committed and would be the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury. While use of this legal theory would
permit a damage claim as well as exclusion of any evidence collected
as a result of the violation from the prosecutor's case-in-chief, it
would probably mandate exclusion of all collateral uses of this
evidence as well.
B. The Fourth Amendment
The Court has held that all § 1983 claims that law enforcement
officers used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other seizure are properly analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment, not substantive due process."' The standard for
determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred
is an objective one: whether the officer's actions were "objectively
the argument that the city's failure to train or warn its employees about known
workplace hazards violated due process).
235 Id. at 1069-70 (citations omitted).
"_ See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that a claim of
excessive force in effectuating arrest was properly analyzed under the Fourth Amend-
ment, which provides "an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against"
physically intrusive governmental conduct, rather than the "more generalized notion
of'substantive due process'"); see also Ward v. City of SanJose, 967 F.2d 280, 284 (9th
Cir. 1991) ("'[U]nder Graham, excessive force claims arising before or during arrest
are to be analyzed exclusively under the [F]ourth [A]mendment's reasonableness
standard rather than the substantive due process standard .. .'") (quoting Reed v.
Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991)).
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reasonable."31 This standard is much more lenient to the plain-
tiff than the substantive due process or Eighth Amendment
standards for excessive force, which require that the plaintiff prove
both that the officer's actions were not objectively reasonable and
that such officer acted with a certain subjective mental state.
238
The Court, however, has not resolved the question whether the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against excessive force continues
to protect individuals where arrest ends and pretrial detention
begins.219 The circuit courts have likewise not resolved the issue
17 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 399 (noting that the Fourth Amendment "reason-
ableness" inquiry is "whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying
intent or motivation").
' The Graham Court rejected, for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysisJudge
Friendly's four-part substantive due process test developed inJohnson v. Click, 481
F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). See Graham, 490 U.S. at
397. Friendly's substantive due process test considered (1) the need for the
application of force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force
that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) whether the force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. See Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
Instead, the Graham Court adopted the more plaintiff-friendly objectively reasonable
test. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 399. Judge Friendly's test was adopted by the Court,
however, in determining whether excessive use of force by a guard against a convicted
prisoner during a riot violated the Eighth Amendment. See Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) ("[T]he question whether the measure taken inflicted
unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on 'whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.'"). Thus the substantive due
process and Eighth Amendment tests for excessive force appear to be identical. Cf
Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1983) (concluding that a
suspect's or pre-trial detainees's substantive due process right to receive medical care
is at least as great as a convicted prisoner's Eighth Amendment protection against
deliberate indifference to his medical needs).
" See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 ("Our cases have not resolved the question
whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with protection
against the deliberate use of excessive physical force beyond the point at which arrest
ends and pretrial detention begins, and we do not attempt to answer that question
today."). The Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment,
which does not attach until after conviction and sentence, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977), applies to all allegations of excessive force against a
convicted prisoner. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992) (holding that
the Eighth Amendment standard applies in § 1983 action alleging beating of shackled
inmate by guard and supervisor). Thus, those citizens who have been successfully
seized and arrested but not convicted remain in a legal limbo between the Fourth and
Eighth Amendments' prohibitions against excessive force.
The Court has, however, applied the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures to pretrial detainees, while refusing to apply the
same protection to convicted prisoners. Compare Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576,
1994]
476 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 417
whether the Fourth Amendment or substantive due process would
protect those, like Mr. Cooper, who have been arrested and booked
but not yet arraigned or convicted.24 °
The better position is to apply the Fourth Amendment to those
pretrial detainees, whether formally charged or not, who were
interrogated prior to being imprisoned or who have been separated
from the general prison population for purposes of interroga-
tion.241 In such situations, application of the less-exacting subjec-
589-90 (1984) (concluding that pretrial detainees maintain limited Fourth Amend-
ment rights similar to those discussed in Bell v. Wolfish) and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520,557 (1979) (evaluating conditions of pretrial detention under the Fourth Amend-
ment's punishment standard) with Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)
(holding that a convicted prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
prison cell and thus has no § 1983 action based upon a Fourth Amendment
violation).
240 Compare Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271,277 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that where
plaintiffin § 1983 suit alleged that officers physically beat him during interrogation,
Fourth Amendment was inapplicable and test to determine whether police used
excessive force against this pretrial detainee, in violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, was Eighth Amendment inquiry as to "whether force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm"); United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 788 n.7 (4th Cir.
1990) (usingJudge Friendly's more rigorous substantive due process test to find that
officers were properly convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 of using excessive force
against a pretrial detainee, and thus declining to reach difficult question of whether
protections of Fourth Amendment extend to pretrial detainee), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1049 (1991) and Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 193-95 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that
where plaintiff in § 1983 and Bivens suit alleged that officers held gun to his head
during interrogation occurring after arrest but before plaintiffwas charged, conduct
may violate due process if it shocks the conscience, but Fourth Amendment
reasonable test does not apply), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026 (1990) with Austin v.
Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that in Bivensaction against
federal agents for beatings during detention, Fourth Amendment applied post-arrest
until arrested suspect's first judicial hearing, at which time substantive due process
test applied) and Gonzalez v. Tilmer, 775 F. Supp. 256, 260-61 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(considering § 1983 cause of action against the police for use of force during
plaintiff's 48-hour detention before arraignment, and holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects such arrestees, while the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
due process analysis is not applicable until after a suspect is formally charged).
As can been seen from the above case descriptions, some courts that do apply
the Fourth Amendment's protection against excessive force beyond the arrest stage
distinguish between those not yet formally charged (where the Fourth Amendment
applies) and those arraigned by ajudicial officer and awaiting trial (where substantive
due process applies). I argue that the policies supporting application of the Fourth
Amendment to interrogation of uncharged suspects apply equally to the interrogation
of suspects who are formally charged. See infra note 243.
241 One commentator suggested that the use of"gratuitously cruel" interrogation
techniques that fail to coerce a confession leave their victim with an excessive force
claim, not a self-incrimination claim. See Dripps, supra note 205, at 633. Professor
Dripps advocates the elimination of the Self-Incrimination Clause from the Fifth
MIRANDA DECONSTITUTIONALIZED
tive test cannot be justified by the usual reasons given in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence-the penological interest in security
242
and the fact that these individuals have already been properly
convicted of a criminal offense and thus cannot complain of certain
punishments.
23
Amendment, and the regulation of confessions under the Fourth Amendment, by
requiring warrants from magistrates before interrogation of a suspect commences.
See id.242 See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 324-25 (holding that infliction of gunshot wound to
convicted prisoner, in the course of prison security measures taken by guards to quell
riot and rescue hostage, does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment even if
that degree of force was unreasonable, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain is actionable under § 1983). In light of the overriding responsibility of prison
officials to maintain the safety of prisoners, visitors, and guards, and the ever-present
potential for violent confrontation requiring hastily made decisions, the Whitley Court
rejected the "deliberate indifference" standard used in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976) for providing medical attention to inmates, and instead adopted the
stricter test outlined by Judge Friendly in Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033. See Whitley, 475
U.S. at 319-21. That is, the Court required the prisoner to prove that the state
official acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Id.
at 320-21.
Pretrial detainees undergoing interrogation, by contrast, are already removed
from the general prison population and thus pose little threat of rioting, smuggling
contraband or weapons, or otherwise causing a disturbance. Cf Bell, 441 U.S. 520,
546 (1979) (holding that maintaining institutional security and preserving internal
order are essential goals that may require limitation of retained constitutional rights
of both convicted and pretrial detainees).
243 This less protective standard is appropriate in Eighth Amendment analysis,
according to the Court, because the Eighth Amendment, as opposed to the Fourth,
applies only after the State has criminally convicted an individual. See Graham, 490
U.S. at 398 ("[T]he less protective Eighth Amendment standard applies 'only after the
State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with
criminal prosecutions.'") (citation omitted); Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16 (noting that a
sentenced inmate can be punished, "[a]lthough that punishment may not be cruel or
unusual under the Eighth Amendment"); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99
(1987) (concluding that prisoners' rights are subject to substantial restrictions as a
result of conviction, thus infringements upon the substantive due process right to
marry and First Amendment right to write letters do not receive strict scrutiny, but
rather are appropriate if "reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest");
Palmer, 468 U.S. at 522-30 (holding that the circumscription or loss of many rights
associated with imprisonment is necessary to accommodate the institutional needs
and objectives of prison facilities, particularly internal security and safety); Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-47 (1981) (finding that, as a function of punishing
convicted persons, prison conditions are typically part of the State's legitimate
restraint of liberty).
While some restrictions upon the liberty interest of an individual accused of a
crime are permissible to ensure that he is available for trial, such a detainee retains
her right to be free of punishment. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 534-37 (noting that although
detention interferes with the detainee's desire to live as comfortably as possible,
confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into punish-
ment); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (recognizing that the government
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Assuming the Court adopts the reasoning above, it could
mandate obedience to the dictates of Miranda by holding that any
police action resulting in a confession that is subsequently deter-
mined to be actually coerced constitutes "excessive force."24 4 This
has a number of advantages over a substantive due process test.
First, the standard for determining whether a violation has oc-
curred, the "objective reasonableness" standard, would eliminate
inquiry into an officer's state of mind. Second, this standard would
be easier for the plaintiff to prove. Finally, the Court prefers to rely
on specific constitutional provisions rather than due process. 45
To fully enforce Miranda, however, the Court would also have
to hold that all intentional violations of Miranda by state or local
officials constitute excessive force within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of whether those violations result in no
confession or a voluntary one. In the latter situation, grafting an
intentionality requirement will allow the officer who mistakenly fails
to administer the warning properly (the "technical violator") to
escape liability, while deterring those who intentionally attempt to
circumvent the Court's rules of behavior. This standard would
require the plaintiff to establish the officer's state of mind. Proving
her intention to violate Miranda, however, would still be less
onerous than proving that the officer acted sadistically with the
may permissibly detain a person suspected of committing a crime prior to a formal
adjudication of guilt). This makes sense in light of the fact that many interrogations
occur after arrest but prior to arraignment. In such a situation, the suspect is closer
in circumstance, and presumably in rights, to an ordinary citizen than a convicted
offender.
24 To reach those instances where psychological pressures produce a coerced
confession, the Court would need to overrule those cases holding that mere
allegations of verbal abuse do not present actionable claims under § 1983. See
McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir.) (finding that not every instance of
threatened violence or intentionally inflicted injury gives rise to a § 1983 claim), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 998 (1983). In making its decision, the Court will also have to
confront the reluctance of most courts to apply the Fourth Amendment in an
interrogation setting. See Cooper , 924 F.2d 1520, 1530 n.19 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd en
banc, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.) (holding Fourth Amendment excessive force claim
inapplicable "as little physical force was employed against Cooper in his arrest"), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 195 (concluding that courts should
not "monitor the details of police interrogations" since due process liberty interest
"is not freedom from unlawful interrogations but freedom from severe bodily or
mental harm"). But see Gonzalez, 775 F. Supp. at 262-63 (finding that while the Fourth
Amendment continues to protect arrestees until formally charged, the denial of food
to plaintiff during his 48-hour detention did not amount to unreasonable use of
force).24
1 See supra notes 227-28 (citing cases in which the Court was reluctant to expand
the concept of substantive due process).
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intent to cause harm or to engage in behavior that shocks the
conscience, as required under the due process standard.
C. Reconstitutionalize Miranda
The simplest solution is to return Miranda to its constitutional
roots by establishing that the recitation of the warnings is the
constitutionally required method of protecting the privilege against
self-incrimination.246  Justice Douglas247 and, more recently, a
number of scholars have championed this position. 248  It is the
present interpretation of Miranda as conclusively presuming that all
statements taken during unwarned custodial interrogation are
involuntary, that makes its exclusionary rule prophylactic. Because
the Court has held that some statements taken in violation of
Miranda are actually voluntary, despite this presumption, it is
possible that a federal court will overturn a state court criminal
conviction based upon the admission of a statement consistent with
the Federal Constitution, although inconsistent with Miranda.
249
The most vigorous response to this criticism is tendered by
Professor Schulhofer, who suggests that Miranda, rather than
offering a conclusive presumption, actually offers a constitutional
interpretation that compulsion is, by definition, present in every
custodial interrogation, and thus the Fifth Amendment is actually
24' This would of necessity include the requirement that the Self-Incrimination
Clause apply at the station house as well as in the courtroom.
2417 Dissenting in Michigan v. Tucker, Justice Douglas opined that "Miranda's
purpose was not promulgation ofjudicially preferred standards foi police interroga-
tion, a function we are quite powerless to perform; the decision enunciated 'constitu-
tional standards for protection of the privilege' against self-incrimination." 417 U.S.
433, 465-66 (1974) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966)) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Douglas believed that if Miranda warnings were not required by the
Constitution, the Court should not have required them, for if Miranda warnings
function simply to punish officers rather than as a constitutional right of the defen-
dant, then "'the Court's action in adopting [them] sounds more like law-making than
construing the Constitution.'" Id. at 465 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
649 (1965)) (Black, J., dissenting).
24s See Ogletree, supra note 38, at 1842 (stating that the per se exclusion of
custodial statements made in the absence of counsel is preferable even to the current
Miranda warnings and would better protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination); Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 461 (arguing that the Miranda
warnings are necessary to protect a suspectes constitutional rights and that "Miranda's
safeguards deserve to be strengthened, not overruled").
2'49 This also raises the specter of Article III illegitimacy. Seesupra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text (noting that several commentators have forcefully urged that the
Court has no authority to overturn a state court criminal conviction absent a federal
constitutional violation).
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violated in every case, unless the warnings are given.
2 50
While Schulhofer's argument eliminates the need to justify
Miranda as a prophylactic rule, it depends upon the acceptance of
a rather strained definition of compulsion. 5  Moreover, a num-
ber of additional problems come to mind. Initially, his theory may
require the reversal of all cases that hold that a Miranda violation is
not a constitutional one. Consequently, any statement obtained in
violation of Miranda would be disallowed for purposes of impeach-
ment, obtaining other leads, and so forth. Aside from potentially
impeding the truth-seeking function of a trial, this practice may
offer undue advantage to the defendant by requiring the prosecutor
to stand idly by while the defendant escapes punishment by
committing perjury.25 2 Alternatively, it may be possible to allow
statements taken in violation of Miranda to be used for impeach-
ment by employing a balancing test. To be sure, the Court balances
government action against individual liberty in certain areas of
constitutional law.
253
An additional hurdle must be overcome before such an
approach would permit a § 1983 action for a Miranda violation.
Even if it is established that every unwarned statement is "com-
pelled," such statements must still be introduced in "criminal
proceedings." 2 4 The reconstitutionalized Miranda doctrine could
o See Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 446-47 ("The [Miranda] Court did not hold
that a brief period of interrogation can involve compulsion. The Court held that the
briefest period of interrogation necessarily will involve compulsion."). In the Fifth
Amendment context, compulsion means "pressure imposed for the purpose of
discouraging the silence of a criminal suspect." Id. at 445 (emphasis omitted). It is
the reason for the pressure rather than its amount that is significant. See id. "Custo-
dial interrogation brings psychological pressure to bear for the specific purpose of
overcoming the suspect's unwillingness to talk, and it is therefore inherently compel-
ling .... " Id. at 446. Thus, one interpretation of Schulhofer's article is that, in
essence, the conclusive presumption of compulsion is not a presumption at all, but
a logical and factual certainty.
"' See Grano, Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 59, at 182-86 (arguing that
Schulhofer's interpretation of the word "compelled" is implausible).
" See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975) (holding that although the
accused was questioned in violation of Miranda, his statements could be used to
impeach his conflicting testimony at trial).
2. For example, the First Amendment protection of free speech can be abridged
if there is an overriding government justification. See e.g., Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) ("[T]he societal value of speech must, on occasion, be
subordinated to other values and considerations.").
25 See supra notes 85-118 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the
failure of police officers to give Miranda warnings does not deprive a suspect of his
constitutional rights unless statements obtained during the interrogation are used
against the suspect at trial).
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avoid this requirement by holding that the station house is part of
the continuing criminal proceeding for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment. 2 5 Such a reading would enable a civil rights suit
against the interrogating officer regardless of whether she was a
witness at trial (defeating the acting under color of law restriction),
and regardless of whether her statements were the proximate cause
of the judge's ruling (making the judge's ,admittance of the
statement irrelevant).256
A better way to justify Miranda25 or any prophylactic rule,
however, is by identifying it as constitutional common law. The
Miranda decision itself began, perhaps inadvertently, down this
path. The warnings promulgated by Miranda cannot be categorized
as garden-variety common law, for Congress could then simply
create legislation to overrule that requirement without providing a
"fully effective" alternative procedure. 5 8 Moreover, these warn-
ings cannot be categorized as true constitutional interpretation, for
then Congress would be unable to replace them with a procedure
255 This is possible only upon an expansive reading of the words contained in the
Self-Incrimination Clause. See David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1082 (1986) (criticizing the
Miranda Court's ruling that a suspect's rights in a pretrial interrogation are grounded
in the Fifth Amendment because at its "core" that Amendment protects against
compelled self-incrimination only in judicial proceedings). The privilege has been
extended, however, to grandjury and juvenile proceedings. See supra note 85. While
there are still situations in which the compulsion to speak is the result of a formal
process, "as a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the
police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where
there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
'5 Seesupra part II.B (explaining why it is virtually impossible to successfully bring
a § 1983 action for a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause).
2 Certain commentators argue that even as a presumption or prophylactic rule,
the Miranda decision should stand. They make these arguments, however, by
referring to social policy rather than offering any source of constitutional authority.
For example, Schulhofer noted that the Court permits prophylactic rules in other
areas of constitutional law, such as conclusively presuming a First Amendment
violation from the possibility that certain kinds of statutes will chill speech. See
Schulhofer, supra note 28 at 448-51. In particular, Schulhofer argues that these
irrebuttable presumptions "minimize adjudicatory error" and are appropriate tools
in a particular context. Id. at 450-51. In the context of the Fifth Amendment, the
due process case-by-case approach left courts and police without the proper guidance
and thus failed to stem compulsion. See id. at 451-52; see also David Strauss, The
Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 190, 191-95 (1988) (arguing that
prophylactic rules are a central and necessary feature of constitutional law,
particularly in the First Amendment area, and that conclusive and rebuttable
presumptions differ only in degree, not in kind).
" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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of its own making, absent a constitutional amendment. I believe
ChiefJustice Warren, whether consciously or not, was promulgating
a controversial genre of constitutional law. Previous constitutional
interpretation divined the "core" meaning of constitutional
provisions, which meaning did not change over time and did not
directly depend upon policy or empirical decisions. This alternative
class of constitutional interpretation is more fluid. The remainder
of this Article reflects my own conception of the Constitution.
Professor Monaghan first coined the phrase "constitutional
common law" in 1975, noting that
a surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional
"interpretation" is best understood as something of a quite
different order-a substructure of substantive, procedural, and
remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but
not required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a
constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification,
or even reversal by Congress.
2 59
I would modify Monaghan's theory and posit that constitutional
common law is in fact required by the Federal Constitution in some
instances, but this requirement is temporary and/or conditional.
Some remedy or procedure is necessary to safeguard a constitution-
al provision, but the Constitution itself does not specify which
remedies or procedures to utilize. Thus it becomes the Court's
obligation under the Constitution to create the body of law
necessary to guarantee that particular constitutional right against
whatever danger it faces. 26  The necessary or appropriate reme-
'59 Monaghan, supra note 10, at 2-3; see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 888-90 (1986) (arguing in favor
of an expansive approach to federal common law and against differentiating between
federal common law and constitutional common law). For opponents of this
doctrine, see, for example, Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for instituting prophylactic rules beyond the
Court's constitutional authority). See generally Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh,
Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1117 (1978) (arguing
that the Court has no authority to create subconstitutional common law, that
Monaghan's theory is nothing more than judicial realism that will turn judges into
legislators and law into politics, and suggesting instead a return to interpretational
constitutionalism).
260 One instance in which the Court initially appeared to utilize constitutional
common law was in creating Bivens damage actions for the violation of constitutional
rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971). Some commentators believe that this remedy is or should be
constitutionally required. See, e.g., Walter F. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The
Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1532, 1557 (1972) ("[C]onstitutional rights
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dies and procedures may change with circumstances and Congress
may provide alternative remedies and procedures of comparable
effectiveness. This "constitutional common law" has the same status
as "true" constitutional interpretation and as federal statutes and
would thus be a proper basis for a § 1983 suit.
In 1994, as in 1966, the Miranda warnings and the exclusion of
statements taken in violation of these warnings are constitutionally
required as part of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination
privilege. These warnings may not be required in the future,
have a self-executing force that not only permits but requires the courts to recognize
remedies appropriate for their vindication."); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and
Constitutional Damage Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (1989) (arguing that the
Bivens remedy is "an indispensable component of constitutional oversight"). The
Court has stressed, however, that the Bivens action springs from federal common law,
and thus the Court, in divining congressional purpose, implies this remedy only when
Congress so intended. The federal common law in Bivens arose not directly from the
Constitution, but rather from the combination of a court's historical ability to provide
a remedy for the violation of individual liberties and from the interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1331, the federaljurisdiction statute. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-97; id. at 405
(Harlan, J., concurring).
Unfortunately, in fashioning-this federalcommon law, over the years, the Court
has altered the test for allowing a Bivens action. The focus of the inquiry has shifted
from whether Congress explicitly declared that an individual could not recover money
damages for violation of a constitutionally-protected right, to whether Congress
offered any remedial mechanism for constitutional violations occurring in a particular
government program, even where the plaintiff is not covered by that remedy.
Compare, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-23 (1980) (holding that a federal
prisoner's right to sue under Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to
medical needs was not preempted by Federal Tort Claims Act, because the FTCA was
not as effective and Congress did not explicitly declare it a substitute) and David v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228,246-47 (1979) (allowing a suit for money damages under Fifth
Amendment for gender discrimination by a Congressman despite Congress's refusal
to extend Title VII to congressional staff) with Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,
417-18, 423 (1988) (holding that the design of the Social Security Disability Benefits
Reform Act of 1984 suggested that Congress had intended it to be the exclusive
remedy for the due-process violation of wrongful termination of disability benefits,
although the Act did not apply to persons, like plaintiffs, whose benefits had been
terminated prior to 1983) and Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1983) (holding
that no damage remedy under the Constitution is permitted for federal civil servant's
dismissal in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights because Congress
provided a comprehensive remedial scheme for these employees, although Congress
did not declare that its remedy was exclusive).
Had the Court termed a Bivens action part of constitutional common law, it
could have looked to the adequacy-rather than to the mere existence-of a
congressional remedial scheme in the area affected by the alleged wrongdoing. See
BetsyJ. Grey, Preemption ofBivens Claims: How Clearly Must Congress Speak?, 70 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1087, 1122-29 (1992) (arguing that due to the importance of the constitution-
al rights at issue, the Court should not deny a Bivens-type damage remedy for a
constitutional violation absent a "clear statement" from Congress to the contrary).
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however, due to changed circumstances. For example, if the nature
of custodial interrogation were ever to become less compelling (say,
if police officers offered suspects tea and crumpets instead of
threats and psychological coercion, or if every interrogation were
videotaped),2 6 ' conditions would then have changed such that the
present constitutional common-law procedure would be unneces-
sary. Likewise, if Congress instituted an effective alternative to the
Miranda warnings, such as by enacting a statute requiring that
defense counsel participate in every custodial interrogation, then
again, the warnings would no longer be required. Although the
interrogation itself would remain equally intimidating, the Court, in
assessing this new procedure, might find the congressional remedy
adequate to protect the privilege and thus find the constitutional
requirement satisfied. Just as the meaning of certain constitutional
provisions may change over time,262 the conditions that inform
these provisions may change as well.
Naturally, one may ask where the Court derives the authority to
create constitutional common law. Although there is certainly no
federal general common law to supplant state rules of decision,
263
261 Two states, Alaska and Minnesota, now have ajudicially imposed requirement
that law enforcement officers electronically record custodial interrogations. See
Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) (holding that the unexcused
failure to record electronically a custodial interrogation violated suspect's right to due
process under Alaska Constitution); Minnesota v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587,592 (Minn.
1994) (requiring the recording of all custodial interrogations, including information
about waiver and holding that a substantial violation of this requirement results in
suppression of statement).
22 For example, it was only in the late 1950s that courts began to use the Due
Process Clause to disallow confessions coerced by psychological rather than physical
means. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 504 (1963) (describing a
suspect's 16-hour interrogation in which he was repeatedly told that if he "cooperat-
ed" he would be allowed to contact his wife and attorney). In 1954, the Supreme
Court repudiated a century-old doctrine by holding that the Equal Protection Clause
no longer allowed separate but equal education for African-Americans. See Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). In 1973, the privacy penumbra of the Bill
of Rights began protecting a woman from state interference in her decision to
terminate her pregnancy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). In 1994,
hopefully, the Equal Protection Clause will be interpreted to provide protection
against discrimination to gays and lesbians. For a further discussion of changes in the
meaning of various constitutional principles, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-4, at 33 (1978) (suggesting that constitutional law is not
determinate, but rather that "the Constitution remains a fundamentally democratic
document, open to competing interpretations limited only by the values which inform
the Constitution's provisions themselves").
216 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal courts
sitting in diversity cases must apply state law to substantive questions, rather than
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there is a species of federal common law appropriate in cases of
overriding federal interest, such as interstate and international
disputes, disputes concerning the rights and obligations of the
United States, and admiralty cases." Moreover, inherent in the
process of federal court decision-making is the need to create
federal common law to fill the legislative gaps in federal stat-
utes.265 Concerns of federalism and separation of powers are
somewhat allayed by the fact that the Court is merely divining
congressional purpose by looking directly to the words, structure,
legislative history, and purpose of the statute, and because of the
need for a uniform national rule of law.
266
A court has a similar duty to assess the constitutionality of state
"declare substantive rules of common law").
264 See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)
("[Flederal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the
rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes....
and admiralty cases.") (citation omitted); see also Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398
U.S. 375, 378 (1970) (allowing action for wrongful death to be brought in federal
court under admiralty law) (superseded by 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1988)); Banco
Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964) ("[T]he scope of the act of state
doctrine must be determined according to federal law.") (superseded in part by 22
U.S.C. § 23 70(e)(2) (1988), which created limited exceptions to the act of state
doctrine); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (stating
that the Court must fashion federal common law to resolve a dispute between the
United States and a bank).
... See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-63
(1983) (employing federal common law to determine the statute of limitations for an
employee's suit for breach of a collective bargaining agreement); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-95 (1982) (inferring a
private cause of action under the Commodity Exchange Act) (superseded by 7 U.S.C.
§ 25 (1988)).
Unfortunately, in the civil rights arena, the post-Warren Courts have used federal
common law almost exclusively to limit the substantive scope of § 1983 and Bivens
actions. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 420-29 (1988) (barring a Bivens
action to recover damages for a due process violation that resulted from the wrongful
termination of social security disability benefits because congressional passage of the
1984 Reform Act provided an adequate remedial mechanism); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1987) (erecting a heightened irreparable harm requirement,
based on principles of federalism, for § 1983 injunctions against unconstitutional state
actions); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-84 (1987) (holding that a Bivens
action could not be maintained by a former serviceman against military officers and
civilians for injuries resulting from nonconsensual administration of the drug LSD
because of the special factor that the experiment arose in the course of an activity
incident to military service); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-13 (1983)
(imposing limits on federal court power to intervene in unconstitutional practices of
local governments).
26 For a general discussion of federal common law, see PAUL M. BATOR ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 849-959 (3d
ed. 1988).
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and federal action in the cases before it. In a civil rights action in
which a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation, or in a criminal
prosecution in which the government attempts to deprive an
individual of constitutionally-guaranteed liberties, the court must
interpret how the Constitution limits the activities of those state and
federal officials. To accomplish this, the Court must divine the
Framers' purpose (if relying on strict constructionism) or the
present meaning of the Constitution (if relying on judicial realism)
by looking to the words, structure, and purpose of the Constitution.
This is precisely the road that the Court travels when it creates
federal common law in a statutory context.
There are numerous advantages to finding that constitutional
common law is constitutionally required. First, it answers the
Article III legitimacy question. The Court would decide a case
"arising under this Constitution" in refusing to incarcerate an
individual whose conviction is based upon a Fifth Amendment
violation, and could, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, 267 over-
turn state convictions so based. Such a finding would also allow a
plaintiff to bring a § 1983 action based upon a violation of the
constitutional common-law prophylactic rule.
Likewise, there are many advantages to using constitutional
common law rather than constitutional interpretation. Built into
these advantages are automatic limits on the dangers of expanding
the Court's role in this manner. Initially, the use of constitutional
common law would ensure that constitutionally guaranteed rights
would have the same contours regardless of the state in which a
citizen lived. Without either a constitutional interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment or constitutional common law requiring Miranda's
exclusionary rule, the rule is illegitimate (as applied to state courts)
under Article III, and a citizen should receive no protection from
it. If, however, the Constitution does require some deterrence
mechanism, but the Court cannot fashion constitutional common
law, then the Court is limited to a case-by-case determination of
whether the state in which the defendant resides has provided a
relief mechanism. Again, the protection would vary among citizens
of different states. A related advantage to using constitutional
common law is that by springing from the Constitution itself, it
267 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
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protects individual rights in a principled manner. This quality
preserves judicial integrity by shielding justices from the criticism
that they are merely implementing their own versions of the social
good and by giving their rulings the force of law they deserve.
There are, of course, federalism concerns with prescribing
detailed rules for state actors to follow. The Court has already
determined, however, that to dispel the coercion inherent in
custodial interrogations, law enforcement officials must be given a
concrete rule to follow (the warnings), and suspects must be given
a remedy to deter violations of the rule (the exclusionary rule).
Constitutional common law, via the Supremacy Clause, trumps any
conflicting state laws or practices and is made necessary by the
state's own failure to control its public officials. Furthermore, the
states will have a voice in determining these prophylactic rules
through their representation in Congress. Because the rules
founded in constitutional common law are not necessarily the only
rules capable of safeguarding a particular constitutional provision,
Congress can change these rules by offering adequate alternative
remedies.268 If the Miranda warnings and attendant exclusionary
rule were based on traditional constitutional interpretation, then
they could never be changed absent a constitutional amendment or
express overruling of Miranda.
Finally, in defining the scope of the constitutional common law
necessary to protect the privilege, the Court can continue to admit
inadvertently unwarned or defectively warned statements to
impeach and gather new leads, as such use will not encourage
officers to violate Miranda or conduct inherently compelling
interrogations. This same constitutional common law, however, can
mandate the exclusion-even for impeachment purposes-of any
statement made after an officer has deliberately ignored a suspect's
requests for silence or counsel. Such exclusion is necessary to
compel officers to deliver the warnings and to counteract the
otherwise compelling nature of custodial interrogation by someone
" This feature vitiates any separation of powers concerns. See Monaghan, supra
note 10, at 29, 34-38 ("Extending individual liberty on a common law basis ...
triggers an important shift in the political process. The Court, in effect, opens a
dialogue with Congress, but one in which the factor of inertia is now on the side of
individual liberty.") (footnote omitted). But see Schrock & Welsh, supra note 259, at
1152-53 (arguing that Monaghan's subconstitutional common law may precipitate a
clash of will between the Court and a Congress that wishes to curtail individual
liberties, and that the definitional problems in distinguishing constitutional from
subconstitutional pronouncements may increase the frequency of this clash).
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who clearly does not intend to honor a suspect's rights. Likewise,
the Court can allow a § 1983 action when law enforcement officials
intentionally ignore Miranda requests for silence or counsel, again
because there is a constitutional violation to be deterred.2 69
CONCLUSION
Those scholars who believe that the Miranda decision was an
unwise one are disturbed primarily by the ostensible broadening of
the rights of criminal defendants and by the legislative rather than
judicial character of the opinion. Such scholars may or may not be
appeased or reassured by my attempt to tie that decision more
closely to its constitutional moorings. But even those who applaud
the deconstitutionalization of Miranda ought to deplore a system in
which courts interpret the law in one manner, yet federal and state
law enforcement officials ignore this interpretation and instead
substitute their own.
Presently, police officers are allowed to apply "cost-benefit"
analysis to constitutional or nonconstitutional adjudication, deciding
whether to obey certain judge-made rules, or whether a net benefit
inheres in breaking these rules and paying the price. By deconstitu-
tionalizing Miranda and holding that no Fifth Amendment violation
can occur outside of a courtroom, important decisions concerning
the content of citizens' civil rights have been shifted from the
judiciary to law enforcement personnel. Courts, legislators, and the
general public should recognize that the United States Supreme
Court has chipped away at Miranda to the point that it can no
longer be called a constitutional requirement and therefore cannot
support a § 1983 action. Thus, the extent to which the dictates of
Miranda remain in force depends wholly upon the opinions and
beliefs of law enforcement officials, as well as the methods they
employ in weighing the competing interests of evidence gathering
versus freedom from government intrusion. Regardless of whether
the fault lies with law enforcement for stretching the limits of court
269 The Court has stated that deterrence of constitutional violations is one of the
goals of § 1983. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310
(1986) ("'Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation
of constitutional rights.... .'") (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256 (1978)).
The intentionality component would be consistent with recent § 1983 cases requiring
intentional state action and is justified by the purpose of the civil rights statute-to
curb abusive government practices.
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mandates in this area, or with the courts for failing to enforce their
mandates, the situation is an intolerable one.
The various proposals in this Article solve the obstacles to
enforcement. Through the use of constitutional common law, the
Miranda decision can continue to supply guidance to police officers
conducting custodial interrogations, protect the privilege against
self-incrimination, conserve resources by providing evidentiary
presumptions forjudges, and provide a basis for aggrieved plaintiffs
to sue pursuant to the civil rights statute. Without some method for
enforcement, we have, in effect, repealed the Self-Incrimination
Clause sub silentio. We are then doomed to return to those
barbaric means of ascertaining truth that the Court has sought to
outlaw.

